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FREE SPEECH AND THE RIGHT OF ENTRY INTO
THE UNITED STATES: LEGISLATION TO REMEDY
THE IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION PROVISIONS OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION ACT
Alexander Wohl*
0 liberty! What crimes are committed in your name.
Madame Roland (1793)1
INTRODUCTION
Americans hear constant reference today to the evils of the McCar-
thy era, that period of the Cold War when the government conducted
interrogations to ferret out possible sources of communism. 2 The gov-
ernment placed innocent people on blacldists because of their political
views and associations,3 and routinely denied them rights guaranteed
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. INT'L THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 351 (Tripp ed. 1987).
2. See N. KiTTRIE & E. WEDLOCK, JR., THE TREE OF LIBERTY - A DOCUtEN-
TARY HISTORY OF REBELLION AND POLITICAL CRIME IN AbiEUCA 395-480 (1986)
(describing the judicial reaction to the legislative and executive regulation of suspect
political individuals and doctrines during the cold war); S. KANFER, A JOURNAL OF
THE PLAGUE YEARS, 80-143 (1973) (examining how the blacklist affected the en-
tertainment industry); L. HELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME 8-12, 35-40 (1976) (describing
the author's testimony before Congress and a general description of blacklists used
during the period); Hiss, How McCarthyism Silenced America, 7 BARRISTER 1, 12-13
(Fall 1980) (describing one "victim's" recollections of the McCarthy period). See gen-
erally FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, DIGEST OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OF COMMUNIS.M IN
THE UNITED STATES (1955) (offering a comprehensive listing of trials of alleged
Communists).
The McCarthy period is named for its most outspoken attacker of so-called Commu-
nists, Senator Joseph McCarthy, although the virulent anti-communism began before
his arrival and continued after his death. See C. BELFRAGE, THE AbIERICAN INQUISI-
TION 1945-1960, 117-27 (1973) (describing Senator McCarthy's anti-Communist at-
tacks and how he used them to gain fame); see also D. CAuTE, THE GREAT FEAR, THE
ANTI-CoMMuNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER 45-50 (1978) (offering a
less emotional McCarthy profile).
3. See BELFRAGE, supra note 2, at 70-79 (describing the loyalty testing and black-
listing of those with any connections to liberal groups); CAUTE, supra note 2, at 17-27,
31-40 (presenting an introduction to the anti-Communist purges of the 1940s and
1950s); KITTRIE & WEDLOCK, supra note 2, at 395 (summarizing the effect of the fear
of communism on the United States government, and the judicial response); see also R.
ROVERE, LOYALTY AND SECURITY IN A DEMOCRATIC STATE, 73-296 (1977) (listing
newspaper and magazine articles from the McCarthy period).
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by the first amendment.4 Although citizens of the United States gener-
ally take these rights and liberties for granted, remnants from this infa-
mous era continue to threaten these freedoms. This Comment focuses
on proposed legislation that, if enacted, would reform one of the most
prominent holdovers of the McCarthy era, the 1952 Immigration and
Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act.5 The McCarran-Walter Act
grants the government the far-reaching power to exclude or deport for-
eign visitors on the basis of their political beliefs, affiliations, or
speech.6
A tenuous balance exists between protecting the national security of
the United States and respecting the freedoms put forth in the Consti-
tution and the Bill of Rights. The Constitution accords Congress vast
powers to regulate the admission of aliens.7 Supreme Court interpreta-
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment states, in pertinent part, that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble." Id.
Although the Bill of Rights does not explicitly grant the freedom of association, the
courts have incorporated this liberty through the fourteenth amendment and expanded
it through judicial decree. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). The Su-
preme Court stated that "[iut is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association
for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assumed
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
5. Immigration and Nationality (McCarran-Walter) Act, Pub. L. No. 414, ch.
477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1582 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
6. Id. § 1182(a)(27)-(29) (1982). For the purposes of this Comment, the term "ex-
clusion" means the denial of a visa granting permission to enter the United States, a
power that arises in the executive branch and that can be manifested through the of-
fices of the Attorney General, the Secretary of State, or the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Services (INS). Id. § 1182 (Supp. IV 1986). The term "deportation" means the
removal of one who has received a visa and is found to violate one of the laws of
immigration or entry to the United States. Id. § 1251 (Supp. IV 1986). See A.C.
GORDON AND H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 4-1, 4-6, 4-182
(1988) (examining the exclusionary and deportation provisions of the McCarran-Wal-
ter Act).
7. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Aliens who are attempting to enter the country are
subject to a line of precedent establishing Congress' authority over immigration and the
limited judicial review employed in that area. See Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 123
(1967) (allowing the exclusion of a homosexual alien under Congress' plenary power to
exclude aliens); Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339-40 (1909)(discussing Congress' power to regulate aliens). These regulations and procedures do
not necessarily need to meet the constitutional standards applicable to United States
citizens. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (denying a special immigration
status for an illegitimate child and his natural father); United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (finding the permanent exclusion of a United
States serviceman's alien wife without a hearing constitutional). See infra notes 73-76
and accompanying text (discussing and noting the difference between alien rights in the
exclusion and deportation contexts). In Kleindienst v. Mandel, the Supreme Court
adopted a standard which gives complete deference to the executive branch as man-
dated by Congress as long as denials are made for a "facially legitimate and bona fide"
reason. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). See infra notes 77-160 and
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tions of the Constitution also extend to recognize the right of an Amer-
ican citizen to receive information and ideas." The Court has weighed
these rights against the government's interest in protecting its citizens.
Because aliens have less protection under the Constitution than Ameri-
can citizens, the rights addressed in American courts are generally the
rights of American citizens, who have the first amendment right to re-
ceive information. 10 Dissatisfied citizens, political activists, and scholars
have argued for the repeal of the McCarran-Walter Act because it in-
fringes, although often legitimately, on first amendment rights., Re-
accompanying text (discussing the case law interpretation of the Kleindienst standard).
Although this Comment focuses on the exclusionary aspects of the law, the proposed
legislation discussed here revamps both the exclusionary and deportation sections of the
McCarran-Walter Act. See Immigration Exclusion and Deportation Amendments,
H.R. 4427, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted as amended in ImMlGRATION EXCLUSION
AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988). A California district court recently held the deportation provisions of the
McCarran-Walter Act unconstitutional as overbroad under the first amendment.
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, No. CV 87-02107-SVW, slip
op. at 51-53 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1989).
8. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (recognizing a constitution-
ally-protected right to receive information and ideas). The freedom to receive informa-
tion requires the uninhibited debate of public issues that all members of society can
participate in as contemplated by the first amendment. New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09
(1974) (emphasizing that censoring prisoners' mail violates the first amendment guar-
antee of freedom of speech); Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969)
(finding that the right of the viewing and listening public is relevant in a dispute over
first amendment rights); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965)
(holding that the first amendment protects an individual's right to recieve unsolicited
Communist propaganda); see Note, First Amendment Limitations on the Exclusion of
Aliens, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rv., 149, 177-79 (1987) [hereinafter First Amendment Limita-
tions] (arguing that the Procunier case is analogous to the alien exclusion cases in that
the courts will not review questions of prison administration and exclusion).
9. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (weighing the rights
of a citizen to receive information through door-to-door advertising of religious meet-
ings against the community's interest in protecting its citizens).
10. See infra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of standing for
alien plaintiffs in first amendment cases); see also American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm. v. Meese, No. CV 87-02107-SVW, slip op. at 7-31 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1989)
(finding that resident aliens charged under the McCarran-Valter Act have standing to
challenge their deportation on first amendment grounds).
11. See CAuTE, supra note 2, at 39, 254 (1978) (noting newspaper accounts criti-
cizing the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act); M. KoNvrrz, CIVIL RxdHrS IN IIbltU-
GRATION 53-92 (1953) (describing one scholar's criticism of the McCarran-Valter
Act); 8 BULL. ATOM. SCIENTnSTs 210, 210-61 (1952) (devoting an entire issue to criti-
cism of American visa policy and noting that the 1952 immigration law slowed the
advancement of American science and learning interests).
President Truman vetoed the McCarran-Walter Act, labeling it "thought control"
and calling it "a mass of legislation which would perpetuate injustices of long standing
against many other nations of the world. . .[and which would] intensify the repressive
and inhumane aspects of our immigration procedures." President's Message to Con-
gress Vetoing the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952-53 PuB. PAPERs 441 (June
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cent litigation surrounding individuals denied entry into this country
has focused renewed attention on the Act,12 including attempts in Con-
gress to repeal, reform, and amend it.13
This Comment argues that Congress must amend those provisions of
the Act that directly conflict with the rights and liberties guaranteed in
the first amendment. These provisions of the Act are a holdover from a
time of rampant xenophobia, and no longer express the beliefs or values
of the American people. Further, this Comment argues that the lack of
a clear legislative mandate creates confusion in the courts. Finally, this
Comment recognizes that even though the Executive Branch must re-
tain certain latitude regarding the exclusion and deportation of aliens,
such action must occur without interfering with an individual's first
amendment rights.
Part I of this Comment examines the legislative history of immigra-
tion restrictions in the United States. Part II explores recent cases and
identifies the standards that courts adopt to evaluate whether alien visi-
tors may be excluded under the McCarran-Walter Act. Part III ana-
25, 1952).
12. See Visa Denials on Ideological Grounds: An Update, 8 SETON HALL LEGIS. J.
249, 263 (1985) [hereinafter Visa Denials] (describing New York City lawyers' call
for a repeal and revision of the McCarran-Walter Act); Helton, Reconciling the Power
to Bar or Expel Aliens on Political Grounds with Fairness and the Freedoms of
Speech and Association: An Analysis of Recent Legislative Proposals, I I FORDHlAM
INT'L L.J. 467, 480-502 (1988) (examining recent legislative proposals to amend the
Act); Kalyen, U.S. Visa Policy, The Machinery of Exclusion, 43 BULL. ATOM. SCIEN-
TIsTS 21, 25 (1987) (examing the methods of excluding aliens); Schapiro, The Exclud-
ables, MOTHER JONES, Jan. 30, 1986, at 29 (examining numerous exclusions and de-
tainments of prominent individuals under the McCarran-Walter Act); Shapiro,
Ideological Exclusions: Closing the Border to Political Dissidents, 100 HARV. L. REv.
930, 933 (1987) (suggesting that the ideological exclusionary provisions are "constitu-
tional anomalies"); Slovinsky, Banned in the U.S.A., 13 HuM. R'rs. 16, 17 (Winter
1986) (analyzing the ideological exclusion provision of the McCarran-Walter Act);
Tilner, Ideological Exclusions of Aliens: The Evolution of a Policy, 2 Gao. IMMIOR.
L.J. 1, 1-85 (1987) (presenting a comprehensive history of American ideological exclu-
sionary policy); First Amendment Limitations, supra note 8, at 151 (examining the
lower courts' interpretation of the legal standard for the ideological exclusion of aliens
from the United States after the Supreme Court decision in Kleindienst); Comment,
Immigration and the First Amendment, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1889, 1928 (1985) [hereinaf-
ter, Immigration and the First Amendment] (urging that the Supreme Court abandon
the special rules it uses for analyzing cases dealing with immigration and the first
amendment).
13. Exclusion and Deportation of Aliens: Hearings on H.R. 1119 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 25-394 (1987) [hereinafter Exclusion Hearings].
Congressional hearings on H.R. 1119, a bill to amend the exclusionary provisions of the
immigration act, offers an opportunity to examine the range of opinions on this issue.
Id. At the hearings, a number of parties called for Congress to pass H.R. 1119. Id. at
79-90, 94-123, 140-53, 216-36, 238-394. See infra notes 146-221 and accompanying
text (describing current legislative proposals to amend the McCarran-Walter Act).
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lyzes the standards set forth by the courts. Part IV examines current
legislative proposals designed to amend or repeal the McCarran-Walter
exclusionary provisions. Part V analyzes this legislation. Part VI rec-
ommends that adoption of this legislation will reconcile the conflict be-
tween the three branches of government and the American citizens'
right to receive information.
I. HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. EARLY ANTI-SEDITION LAWS
The history of governmental exclusion of aliens is a long one, based
on fears of internal, as well as external dissent.14 Early American lead-
ers worried about dissenting opinion and the possibility that such opin-
ion might turn into action against the government.' The fear of dissent
and disruption was often attributed to the arrival of foreigners,'2 or to
an isolationist reaction to global 7 or national crises. 8 Thus, when the
nation and the world are in turmoil, and immigration levels are high,
American xenophobia escalates.1"
14. See KITTRIE & WEDLOCK, supra note 2, at 3-128 (discussing the methods the
early American settlers and governments used to deal with popular unrest).
15. See S.E. MORRISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 352,
377 (1952) (describing Federalist Party attempts to quell dissenting opinion); COMItT-
TEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION OF
ALIENS UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT 5-22 (Comm. Print 1988)
[hereinafter GROUNDS FOR EXCLUSION]; see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
521 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (affirming the criminal conspiracy convictions
of leaders of the American Communist Party and examining the history of sedition in
the United States). As early as 1790, several state constitutions expressly imposed lia-
bility for abuse of the right of free speech. Id. at 521. In 1798, Congress passed the
Alien and Sedition Act under the directive of President Adams, to silence his critics at
a time when the French Revolution had aroused cries for similar rebellion in the
United States. Alien and Sedition Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798), 50 U.S.C. § 21
(1982). The Act was one in a series of anti-alien laws that one commentator cites as
the beginnings of the American immigration policy of deportation. Tilner, supra note
12, at 8-13.
16. See G. PERRETT, AMERICA IN THE TWENTIES 78-81 (1982) (describing the al-
leged danger of new immigrants); see also Tilner, supra note 12, at 16 (describing
problems due to immigration); CAUTE, supra note 2, at 224-26 (investigating reaction
from "fear of the germ-carrying alien").
17. See F. ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY 16, 38-62 (1964) (describing how the fallout
from World War I led to the fear of Bolshevism); KONVITZ, supra note 11, at 122-23
(describing American reaction to several global events); Tilner, supra note 12, at 10
(depicting how the French Revolution caused fear in the United States).
18. See ALLEN, supra note 17, at 38-62 (describing how labor unrest led to the
Palmer raids and a general fear for "public safety"); Tilner, supra note 12, at 26-29
(describing how President William McKinley's assassination by "a self-proclaimed an-
archist" revived American xenophobia).
19. See ALLEN, supra note 17, at 138-62 (revealing the turmoil in the United
States stemming in large part from distrust of foreigners in the aftermath of World
1989]
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There is a constant conflict between protecting the borders of the
United States and protecting the rights of its citizens, as propounded in
the Constitution and Bill of Rights.2 0 Legal disputes traditionally
center around whether the government should punish individuals who
actually participate in "crimes" or whether the government also should
prosecute those who are passively involved in the act through writing
and suggesting such actions. 1 By the beginning of the 20th century,
the legal basis for restricting immigrants and visitors to the United
States encompassed both thought and action.2
War I); Tilner, supra note 12, at 64 (concluding that intolerance to new ideas increases
during periods of international tensions); Koffier and Gershman, Seditious Libel, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 816, 830 (1984) (arguing that two periods of national hysteria, the
Great Red Scare and McCarthyism, followed two periods of international crises, World
War I and World War II).
20. Koffier and Gershman, supra note 19, at 825. Even Thomas Jefferson, among
others, condemned the Sedition Act at its conception. Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 521-22 (1951) (Frankfurter J., concurring). Nevertheless, the concept of si-
lencing critical speech and political association remained part of this country's heritage.
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 668 (1925) (sustaining a criminal anarchy
statute conviction for advocating the necessity of accomplishing the Communist revolu-
tion); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (upholding convictions for
conspiring to violate the 1918 amendments to the Espionage Act). Jefferson's condem-
nation of the Sedition Act was due more to his belief in federalism and that states
should hold this power than to a belief in unrestrained speech on political matters. See
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (noting Jefferson's letter to Abigail
Adams).
21. See Tilner, supra note 11, at 4-51 (examining the differences in the early Alien
and Sedition Acts regarding the inclusion of punishment for seditious writing or speak-
ing); PERRETT, supra note 16, at 52-53 (describing criminal syndicalism laws in 32
states); see also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 324 (1957) (distinguishing advo-
cacy of action from advocacy of belief); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72
(1927) (affirming two convictions under a 1919 criminal syndicalism statute and deny-
ing the contention that the state may not punish those who abuse freedom of speech).
But see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (overturning a criminal
syndicalism statue as a violation of the first and fourteenth amendments and establish-
ing the rule that the government may only prohibit speech that is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce imminent lawless action).
22. Immigration Act of 1903, Pub. L. No. 162, ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213 (1903), 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1182 (Supp. IV 1986). The anti-anarchist law was passed in the after-
math of President McKinley's assassination by a self-proclaimed anarchist. KoNVITz,
supra note 11, at 28. In its original form, the Act provided for the exclusion and depor-
tation of anarchists and others who believed in or advocated the violent or forceful
overthrow of the United States government. Id.
The Supreme Court eventually rejected a challenge to the Immigration Act. United
States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904). Turner was a British
citizen who had entered the country on a speaking tour and declared himself an an-
archist during a New York lecture. Id. at 282-83. In his defense, Turner challenged the
Act for failing to differentiate between philosophical and militant anarchists, thereby
violating the first amendment. Id. at 285, 292-93. The Court upheld the statute, stating
that Congress has almost unlimited power to exclude aliens, state the terms on which
they may enter the country, and deport those who enter in violation. Id. at 289-90.
Many legal historians have suggested that the first amendment was essentially ig-
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World War I and its aftermath compounded the exclusionary ten-
dencies of the American people.23 This ethnocentrism, combined with
rising class conflict, growing socialist organizations,2 ' and the develop-
ing Russian Revolution,25 increased suspicion and turned attention to
alleged anarchists, socialists, and communists. 26 Major Supreme Court
cases of that era involved anti-war protests of Charles Schenck, Jacob
nored during the years between the Sedition Act of 1798 and the Espionage Act of
1917. Rabban, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE LJ. 514, 517-
18 (1981). More recent studies have suggested, however, that post-World War I activ-
ity did not arise from a void and, although courts rarely ruled in favor of first amend-
ment liberties, there were numerous cases contesting the meaning of the first amend-
ment and contributing to the elaboration of judicial doctrine in later years. Id. at 595.
23. See ALLEN, supra note 17, at 16, 38-62 (examining the reactions of the re-
turning soldiers and their families following World War I); KoNviTZ, supra note 11, at
122 (describing the American post-war fear of aliens); PERRM!T, supra note 16, at 53-
55 (recounting several postwar incidents demonstrating the continuing fever pitch of
emotion in the United States at that time); Tilner, supra note 12, at 39 (revieving the
increase of American xenophobia following the end of World War I); see also RovERF,
supra note 3, at 8-71 (compiling newspaper articles of the post-World War I period
detailing American attitudes); Rabban, supra note 22, at 519 (surveying the effect of
World War I and other incidents of the period on the first amendment).
24. ALLEN, supra note 17, at 40. Many liberal intellectuals and members of the
labor movement supported socialistic ideals. Id.; see R. STEEL, VALTER LIPPMAN AND
mE AiERICAN CENTURY, 23-44 (1981) (examining Walter Lippman's conversion to
and growth away from the socialist movement). A mass Socialist Party membership
never developed, however. ALLEN, supra note 17, at 40. One study of the period esti-
mated the number of members of the Socialist Party, the Communist Labor Party and
the Communist party combined to be "hardly more than two-tenths of one percent of
the adult population of the country; id. at 40-41. Nevertheless, post-war America was a
place where unfounded fear of "Bolsheviks" existed. Id. at 49-50. This fear led to the
use of virulent anti-labor attacks on socialists, Jews, labor organizers, Slavs, and the
International Workers of the World. Id. See also BELFRAGE, supra note 2, at 9-14(describing the historical roots of socialism in the United States).
25. See ALLEN, supra note 17, at 16-17 (describing the postwar effects of anti-
Bolshevism sentiment). The "Red Scare" of this period found its worst outpourings in
the so-called Palmer Raids of 1919-20, named after A. Mitchell Palmer, the United
States Attorney General at the time. Id. at 46-49; PERRE-rr, supra note 16, at 59-62;
Tilner, supra note 12, at 46-47. In the Palmer Raids, the executive branch applied the
1918 Sedition Act to eliminate the "threat" of Communists and Socialists through de-
portation of anyone associated with those organizations. See ALLEN, supra note 17, at
46-49 (examining the guilt by association used during the Palmer Raids); See also
ROVERE, supra note 3, at 40-71 (compiling newspaper articles of the period describing
the Raids).
26. See ALLEN, supra note 17, at 38-62 (discussing "The Big Red Scare'); PER-
REMr, supra note 16, at 51-71 (examining the backlash against the Socialist move-
ment). Legislation specifically targeting Communists did not become law until 1950.
See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text (examining the specific anti-communist
provisions of certain laws). There was definitely a switch from a governmental focus on
anarchists to concentration on communists, however, as the Palmer Raids and other
Congressional activities demonstrated. Tilner, supra note 12, at 51; see ALLEN, supra
note 17, at 41-50 (describing government prosecution of activities of the post-World
War I dissenters).
1989]
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Frohwerk, and Eugene Debs 27 In each case, the Court convicted the
protester of violating the 1917 Espionage Act,28 and in the Schenck
case, applied the "clear and present danger" test that outlawed suffi-
ciently "dangerous" speech.29
Congressional enactment of the Espionage Act and other World War
I era anti-alien laws"0 came at the peak of the nation's xenophobia dur-
ing this period; shortly thereafter these emotions began to recede in
post-war malaise. 31 The statutes lay dormant for several decades, until
the period surrounding World War II. It was then that Congress again
became active in restricting the rights of aliens and Communists, using
much of the legislation that was already on the books.32
27. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919) (finding a speech criticiz-
ing the war and prophesizing "a sane socialist society" violated the Espionage Act);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (finding that defendant's newspa-
per's message criticizing the American government's entry into World War I and ac-
cusing the government of murder for sending American troops to France violated the
Act); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919) (finding that printing of a
leaflet that urged opposition to the draft violated the Act).
28. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919). See
Rabban, supra note 22, at 582-86 (examining the Espionage Act cases in the context
of the history of the first amendment).
29. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919). The "clear and present
danger test" measured the illegality of speech in terms of proximity and degree. Id. In
Schenck, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes ruled that defendants' written attacks on the
government obstructed the draft and criminally violated the Espionage Act, overcom-
ing the presumption of freedom of association. Id. Holmes wrote that "the question in
every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substan-
tive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Id.
One commentator has noted that Holmes' decision abandoned ordinary judicial re-
straints on criminal convictions, such as mens rea, and replaced them with rhetoric in
line with anti-socialist sentiment of the times. Koffler and Gershman, supra note 19, at
832. But see Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissent-
ing) (arguing that words alone should not provide a basis for a criminal conviction, and
that a need for a marketplace of ideas exists). Some scholars suggest that Holmes'
early opinions in cases like Schenck paved the way for his later, more liberal readings
of the first amendment. Koffler and Gershman, supra note 19, at 840.
30. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, 18 U.S.C. § 11, 791-94
2388, 3241 (1982).
31. Tilner, supra note 12, at 51, With peace and prosperity, the fears that normally
generated anti-alien reaction dissipated. Id.
32. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (describing how anti-communist
legislation such as the McCarran-Walter Act derived from earlier anti-alien laws).
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B. OUTLAWING COMMUNISM
1. The 1940 Alien Registration Act
Although the span of years known today as the McCarthy period is
not unique in American history for its scapegoating or lack of toler-
ance, it was exceptional in its ferocity.33 While World War II was the
major force generating the hysteria and fear of foreigners that created
the Cold War,34 McCarthyism had its roots in the years preceding the
war and the laws created during that time. One of the earliest and
most important laws that helped shape the struggles over ideological
exclusions was the Alien Registration Act of 1940, commonly known as
the Smith Act. 5
The Smith Act had its basis in the great fear of communism and
political upheaval.36 In many states, the fear led to the enactment of
criminal syndicalism and anarchy statutes, subsequently incorporated
into the Smith Act.3 Designed to prohibit conspiracies and directed
33. CAUTE, supra note 2, at 17-18. The author notes that while the Cold War
period was a discredited one in American history, it was not as painful or destructive as
similar periods in other countries, such as the eras of Stalin, Hitler, or the French
Revolution. Id. Nevertheless, because the Cold War years were violations of the United
States' "traditions, ideals and rhetoric," as well as against individuals, the author sug-
gests that "when America sins, she sins doubly." Id. at 18.
Alger Hiss, whose case attracted international notoriety, has suggested that to fully
understand the origins of McCarthyism, one needs to reexamine other periods of
scapegoating in United States history. Hiss, supra note 2, at 53. These periods of
scapegoating, according to Hiss, include the Salem witch-hunts, the Alien and Sedition
Acts, the Know-Nothing (anti-Roman Catholic) movement of the 19th century, the
Palmer Raids, the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, and for-
mer President Richard Nixon's "disregard of the Constitution" during the Watergate
scandal. Id.
34. See CAUTE, supra note 2, at 224-26 (describing the unfounded rise in the fear
of foreigners in the period prior to World War 11); Tilner, supra note 12, at 53 (high-
lighting World War II's exacerbation of an already intense preoccupation with national
security). Alger Hiss argues that the period immediately following World War II was
one of instability and was highly susceptible to "rabble rousing and scapegoating."
Hiss, supra note 2, at 54.
35. Alien Registration (Smith) Act, Pub. L. No. 76-670, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 671
(1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385-2387 (1982)). The act, named after
Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia, was the first peacetime federal sedition
law since the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. KrrrTIE AND WEDLOCK, supra note 2,
at 356.
36. See BELFRAGE, supra note 2, at 35 (explaining that the Smith Act was similar
in nature to the Alien and Sedition Laws); see also S. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUI-
SITION - JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE COLD WAR, 152-53 (1982) (describing the
background of the Smith Act and several of its more prominent uses).
37. CAUTE, supra note 2, at 70-75. The Smith Act made it a crime to advocate,
teach, publish, or distribute any material promoting any group that has the goal of
overthrowing the government. Alien Registration (Smith) Act, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670,
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primarily at the Communist Party, the Smith Act placed a heavy bur-
den of proof on the government to secure convictions. 8 The suspicious
nature of the times, however, led the Supreme Court to often lighten
this burden. 9 To further aid the prosecution of Communists, Congress
added former belief in, or advocacy of, the proscribed doctrines, and
former membership in the proscribed organization to the list of grounds
for exclusion and deportation from the United States to the Smith
Act.
40
Dennis v. United States41 was the case that substantially helped af-
firm this policy. The Court in Dennis sustained the Smith Act conspir-
acy convictions of twelve Communist party members.42 The Court tried
to define what threshold action was necessary to prosecute political ac-
tivists such as Communists under the Smith Act.43 Although the early
671 (1940) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2385-2387 (1982)); see Linde,
"Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Disonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1176-78 (1970) (examining the Smith Act in terms of the clear
and present danger test).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982). The Government had to prove that the violation was
done "knowingly or wilfully." Id.
39. CAUTE, supra note 2, at 144. The author states that the Supreme Court, from
1946 to 1953, under Chief Justice Fred Vinson, complied with the directives of admin-
istrative persecution and Congressional inquisition. Id.
40. Id. at 229. The change broadened a Supreme Court interpretation of the 1918
Act whereby only present belief and standing in proscribed organizations was punisha-
ble. Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 30 (1939).
41. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
42. Id. at 517. The court of appeals had held that the petitioners turned a peaceful
Communist group into one working toward the violent and forceful overthrow of the
government. Id. at 498. In its plurality opinion, the court portrayed the Communist
party as a highly sophisticated and dangerous organization. Id. The court noted that
Congress has the power to protect the government from armed rebellion. Id. at 50.
43. Id. The Dennis decision offers a variety of interesting opinions. Id. at 494-592.
The plurality found that only a low degree of activity was necessary for guilt under the
Smith Act. Id. at 509 (plurality opinion). The Chief Justice stated that the clear and
present danger test does not mandate that the government must wait until the last
minute before executing a plan to prosecute the parties. Id. at 498. Justice Frank-
furter's concurring opinion distinguishes between a statement expressing an idea that
prompts its hearer to take unlawful actions, and those statements advocating that such
action be taken. Id. at 518 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Justice Jackson agreed with
the distinction, yet noted the difficulty of drawing such a line. Id. at 572 (Jackson, J.,
concurring). He suggested that it would be virtually impossible to determine whether
conduct would create a clear and present danger of violent overthrow, noting that such
a determination would include an appraisal of imponderables which would baffle even
the most sophisticated and informed foreign officers and politicians. Id. The dissenting
Justices, Justices Black and Douglas, envisioned setting a higher threshold for the
"clear and present danger" test. Id. at 580-81. Justice Douglas pointed out that while
the freedom to speak is not absolute, this case was not one of extreme illegality. Id. at
581 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Black agreed, noting that the petitioners were not
charged with any overt acts but merely that they had agreed to assemble, talk, and
publish certain ideas at a later date. Id. at 579 (Black, J., dissenting).
Eighteen years later, in Brandenburg v. Ohio, which limited the government's ability
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governmental restrictions on individuals prior to and through the enact-
ment of the Smith Act did not specifically name the Communist party
as its primary focus, the intent of the restrictions was clear.4 By the
beginning of the 1950s, the Supreme Court already had upheld anti-
Communist party legislation.'
With the death of Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson in 1953 and his
replacement by Earl Warren, however, the Supreme Court began to
revise its philosophy of guilt by association with the Communist
party.4 6 Yates v. United States47 was the most crucial decision of this
period. In Yates, the Court effectively reversed the Dennis ruling and
to prohibit speech, Justice Douglas sharply criticized Dennis, suggesting that the clear
and present danger test was so "twisted and perverted" that it made the trial of the
teacher of marxism an all out political event. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 US. 444, 454
(1969).
44. See CAUTE, supra note 2, at 229-30 (discussing the gradual progression toward
immigration legislation specifically prohibiting communists from admission into the
United States).
45. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 592 (1952) (upholding the de-
portation of aliens who were previously members of subversive groups). Loyalty oaths,
another way in which both state and federal governments attempted to ensure that
their employees were not communists, received a record of mixed approval from the
Supreme Court. Compare Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720 (1951)
(upholding a Los Angeles loyalty oath statute on the grounds that past loyalty may
have a reasonable relationship to present and future trust) with Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (finding an anti-Communist party loyalty oath unconstitu-
tional on the grounds that membership itself may be innocent, thereby causing the oath
to violate due process). One historian suggests that although Congress intended the
1940 revision of the 1918 Immigration Act to target the Communist party, the party
may actually have escaped such persecution. CAuTE, supra note 2, at 229.
46. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 300 (1961) (reversing the Smith Act
conviction of a Communist worker through a finding of insufficient evidence of illegal
party advocacy); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 338 (1953) (reversing the
Smith Act convictions of 14 "second-string" Communist party officials); United States
v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 260 (1967) (finding that the Subversive Activities Control Act
of 1959, which imposed heavy criminal penalties on any member of a Communist-
action organization who engaged in any employment in any defense facility violated the
first amendment freedom of association because the means chosen to achieve the ends
was not the least drastic means). But see Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 254-
55, (1961) (affirming the Smith Act conviction of a district Communist party chairman
under the membership clause rather than under the more frequently used advocacy and
organizing clauses of the Smith Act). In his dissent in Scales, Justice Douglas com-
pared the law and the Court's ruling with the repressive Eighteenth Century Alien and
Sedition Acts. Id. at 263. See also Mollan, Smith Act Prosecutions: The Effect of the
Dennis and Yates Decisions, 26 U. PrrT. L. REv. 705, 747-48 (1965) (concluding that
after Yates, courts could restrict speech based on either advocacy or incitement to
action).
Many statutes targeting Communists, in particular those dealing with loyalty oaths,
were overturned on the grounds of "vagueness" and "overbreadth." See Baggett v. Bul-
litt, 377 U.S. 360, 366 (1964) (striking down as vague a Washington state loyalty
oath); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961) (striking down
Florida loyalty oaths as unconstitutionally vague).
47. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1953).
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distinguished an action involving the overthrow of the government from
abstract discussion or writing suggesting such action.48 Although the
decision in Yates reduced the number of Smith Act prosecutions, 49 the
Supreme Court still upheld the convictions of communists under the
membership clause of the Smith Act. 0
The Smith Act was one of the many laws Congress created during
that period to address the communist "problem." ' Others included the
48. Id. In contrast to its decisions in cases specifically targeting the Communist
party, the Supreme Court, in the so-called NAACP cases, went out of its way to make
the necessary separation between illegal action and constitutionally protected expres-
sion for that organization. Emerson, Freedom of Association, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 30(1964). In one such case, the government prosecuted members of the NAACP for their
refusal to produce branch membership lists. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 457 (1958). The government was attempting to ascertain whether certain
alleged members of the Communist party or communist-front organizations were active
in the NAACP. Id. at 467. The Court, however, held for the NAACP. Id.
49. CAUTE, supra note 2, at 208. By the end of 1956 there were 145 indictments
under the Smith Act resulting in 108 convictions, 10 severances, and 10 acquittals. Id.
50. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 252-53 (1961). In Scales, the state origi-
nally arrested the defendant in 1954 and charged him with knowing membership in the
Communist party. Id. at 206. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction by a 5-4 vote
on the grounds that although the Court attributed no violent action to Scales himself,
his words and conduct demonstrated that he was both active within the Party and fully
conversant with its illegal activity. Id. at 254-55. Interestingly, there was a contrary
ruling in the companion case. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299 (1961)
(holding that clear proof that a defendant specifically intends to accomplish the aims of
the organization through violence is necessary for a conviction under the Smith Act).
In Noto, the Court overturned the lower court's ruling. Id. at 300. The Court distin-
guished the two cases, stating that the proof sufficient in Noto to support the jury's
verdict of present illegal party advocacy was lacking in Scales "in any adequately sub-
stantial degree." Id. at 299.
The courts have significantly expanded the first amendment freedoms of speech and
association since the creation of the Smith Act and the Internal Security Act. See
Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969) (hold-
ing that students are allowed freedom of expression in schools provided it does not
cause disorder or disturbance); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1968) (find-
ing unconstitutional an Ohio criminal syndicalism statute because it failed to distin-
guish between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action); see also
Rabban, supra note 22, at 594 (noting that the modern trend of first amendment ex-
pansion had its roots in pre-World War I litigation).
Even with this expansion, however, courts are reluctant to correct executive decisions
on immigration policy when they interact with the first amendment. Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1957). Instead, they bow to a history of a strong legisla-
ture and the assignment of power to the Executive. Id. at 761. Some commentators
argue that the judiciary must change its overly deferential tests and be more willing to
engage in "normal," more stringent first amendment review. See Immigration and the
First Amendment, supra note 12, at 1890 (arguing that there is no reason to show
special deference to the government in cases that harm citizens' first amendment inter-
ests); First Amendment Limitations, supra note 8, at 200 (suggesting that the "facially
legitimate and bona fide" standard adopted in Kleindienst v. Mandel is unjustified).
See infra notes 77-87 and accompanying text (examining the Kleindienst decision).
51. See Tilner, supra note 12, at 55-56 (describing the incorporation of the Smith
Act and other legislation into the McCarran-Walter Act).
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Displaced Persons Act of 194852 and the Internal Security Act of
1950.53 In Title I of the Internal Security Act, Congress banned the
admission of aliens whose entrance to the United States "would be
prejudicial to the public interest, or would endanger the welfare or
safety of the United States."" Furthermore, the Act extended rules
requiring suspect organizations, including domestic "Communist-ac-
tion" and "Communist-front" groups, to register with the govern-
ment. 5 This restrictive legislation, however, only laid the groundwork
52. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, ch. 647, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009,
1014 (1948) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. App. § 1951 (1982)).
53. The Internal Security (McCarran) Act of 1950, ch. 1024, Pub. L. No. 81-83 1,§ 781, 64 Stat. 987 (1950) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1982)). The
Internal Security Act marked the first time that communists and fascists were specifi-
cally excludable. SENATE SUBCONINI. ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY: 1952-1986, S. REP.
No. 100, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1987) [hereinafter CRS REPORT]. The increasing
awareness of many Americans to the existence of a world Communist movement oc-
curred through events such as the Communist takeover of mainland China, the subver-
sion of Eastern European democracies, and the Korean War. KITTRIE & WEDLOCK,
supra note 2, at 407. This growing cognizance helped create the national mood neces-
sary for the advancement of anti-subversive legislation such as the 1950 McCarran
Act. Id. The Act required such a high degree of investigation into individuals' back-
grounds to see if they fell within the definition of "totalitarian," that several congress-
men, including Senator McCarran and Representative Walter, suggested to the State
Department that the term should not apply to Nazis and Fascists. CAutr, supra note
2, at 253.
54. The Internal Security (McCarran) Act of 1950, ch. 1024, title 1, § § 1-32, 64
Stat. 987 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § § 1102-82, 18 U.S.C. § § 791-95, 22
U.S.C. § § 611, 618, 50 U.S.C. § § 781-826). Other features of the Act included
registration of Communist organizations, the strengthening of the espionage laws, and
the detention of potential spies and saboteurs in times of emergency. Id. title II, § §
100-16, 64 Stat. 1019 (codified as amended at 50 U.S. § § 81 1-26).
Several senators who opposed the Internal Security Act offered a compromise bill
that was never discussed on the Senate floor, due largely to Senator McCarran's domi-
nating role as chairman of the Judiciary Committee. Tilner, supra note 12, at 63. In-
stead, when the bill's sponsors incorporated into law what was intended as "a liberal
maneuver to divert the cannibal's appetite" they unintentionally helped make its provi-
sions more restrictive. CAUTE, supra note 2, at 39. President Truman vetoed the mea-
sure, saying it would not achieve the intended objective and "would make a mockery of
the Bill of Rights and of our claims to stand for freedom in the world." President's
Message to Congress Vetoing the Internal Security Bill, 1950 PUB. PAPERS 645, 650. A
few senators, including Hubert Humphrey, also joined the opposition to the Internal
Security Act. Id. Congress, however, resoundingly overrode the veto in an election year
campaign characterized by "red-baiting." See CAUTE, supra note 2, at 39-40 (describ-
ing the practice by nominees of both political parties during the 1948-1952 election
campaigns of labeling their opponents Communists or communist sympathizers); see
also BELFRAGE, supra note 2, at 58, 137 (examining individual election campaigns).
55. 50 U.S.C. § 782(10) (1982). The Act defined "Communist-action organiza-
tion" and "Communist-front organization" as non-diplomatic groups in the United
States that are substantially directed or controlled by Communist foreign governments.
Id. In addition, the primary purpose of the group must be to give aid and support to a
Communist-action organization, a Communist foreign government, or the world Coin-
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for a much more comprehensive immigration bill addressing a wide
range of immigration policies.
2. The McCarran-Walter Act
The McCarran-Walter Act 56 was the culmination of the battle be-
tween conservative anti-immigrationists and more liberal, less xenopho-
bic congressmen. 57 The Act took a systematic approach to the "immi-
gration problem," codifying and combining earlier laws 8 and
modifying and reinforcing previous policy. 9 The McCarran-Walter
Act is a law that has evoked controversy since its inception,"0 including
both a strongly worded presidential veto and a subsequent congres-
sional override. 61 This Comment focuses on sections 212(a)(27)-(29) of
munist movement. Id. By broadening the bill's language, the government extended the
rules to the so-called "fellow travelers" and non-subversive, progressive, and left wing
groups as well as the Communist organizations. CAUTE, supra note 2, at 136; see
GROUNDS FOR ExCLUSION, supra note 15, at 48-50 (examining the legislative history
of the Act).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1982). The Act was named for its sponsors, Senator Pat
McCarran (D. Nevada) and Representative Francis E. Walter (D. Pennsylvania).
KONVITZ, supra note 11, at 53 n.152.
57. CRS REPORT, supra note 53, at 1. See CAUTE, supra note 2, at 39 (describing
the legislative battles over the Act); Tilner, supra note 11, at 63 (describing congres-
sional debate over the Act). Many of the same battles that took place over the Internal
Security Act two years earlier were repeated, including a presidential veto. See supra
notes 53-54 and accompanying text (describing the history surrounding these earlier
legislative skirmishes).
58. CRS REPORT, supra note 53, at 1. One comparative study of the two docu-
ments notes that in one instance the McCarran-Walter Act treats subversion less com-
prehensively than the Internal Security Act of 1950 in only one instance: the definition
of "totalitarian party" in the 1952 Act fails to include parties like the Nazis or Fas-
cists. Tilner, supra note 12, at 68 n.496.
59. CRS REPORT, supra note 53, at 2-3. The legislation was based in large part on
Senator McCarran's restrictionist belief that "assimiliation is the key to a sound immi-
gration system." See KONVITZ, supra note 10, at 53 (quoting Senator McCarran's
views as expressed in a letter to the Christian Science Monitor of January 10, 1953).
Aside from retaining ideological exclusions, the Act eliminated racial or sexual dis-
crimination as a bar to immigration and introduced a national origins quota system.
CRS REPORT, supra note 53, at 3.
60. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (listing sources of dissenting
opinion).
61. President's Message to Congress Vetoing the Immigration and Nationality Act,
1952-53 PUB. PAPERS 441. Truman suggested in his veto message the creation of a
commission to examine American immigration policy. Id. Following Congress' failure
to heed his advice, the President unilaterally established a commission to examine
United States immigration and naturalization policies and to make recommendations.
See Tilner, supra note 12, at 72. Not surprisingly, the commission's report was highly
critical of the legislation, and recommended its repeal. Id.
According to one commentator, the 1952 legislation adopted the view that immigra-
tion was a source of danger to the nation and that therefore legislation regulating it
should be protectionist in nature. CRS REPORT, supra note 53, at 3. The Truman
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the Act that incorporate, as well as add to, the ideological exclusionary
provisions of the 1950 Internal Security Act, the 1940 Alien Registra-
tion (Smith) Act, and other legislation. 2 The criticisms of these sec-
tions result from their vagueness and their focus on belief and associa-
tion instead of activity as grounds for exclusion. 3
Section 212(a)(28) is the most criticized of the three provisions for
two reasons: first, it lacks a time limit for punishment for advocating
the proscribed activities; and second, it punishes the mere writing, pub-
lishing or distribution of materials connected with the proscribed activi-
ties." The result is that the United States government may prohibit
entry of individuals interested only in speaking to American citizens,
Commission, however, believed that such legislation should reflect openness and friend-
liness. Id. But see CAUTE, supra note 2, at 28-29 (pointing out that Truman was a
fervent anti-Communist, a position based on more than just a determination not to be
outgunned by the Republicans). Others have suggested that Truman's knowledge of
history, in particular his awareness of President Jefferson's example of dealing with the
Alien and Sedition Act hysteria of 1798, enabled him to keep calm in Senator McCar-
thy's presence. MORRISON, supra note 15, at 1051.
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1982). Other portions of section 212 have also recently
aroused controversy, notably section 212(a)(4), the provision allowing for the exclusion
of aliens who are afflicted with psychopathic personality, a sexual deviation, or a
mental defect. Id.; see also Silvers, Exclusion and Expulsion of Homosexual Aliens,
15 COLuM. HUM. Ris. L. REv. 295, 322-32 (1984) (arguing that exclusion on the basis
of homosexuality cannot withstand scrutiny under constitutional standards); Note, Ho-
mosexual Aliens Excludable without Certificate as Psychopathic Personalities - In
re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439 (5th Cir. 1983), 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 537, 537 (examin-
ing the In re Longstaff decision finding that even voluntarily admitted homosexuality
precludes lawful admission and bars subsequent naturalization). One commentator has
categorized the McCarran-Walter Act as one that groups Communists and anarchists
with such social outcasts as prostitutes, professional beggars, and psychopaths. Visa
Denials, supra note 12, at 252.
Recent congressional committee activity on a bill that would limit the government's
power to exclude certain individuals demonstrated the conflicting opinions in this area
of immigration law. Michaelson, Panel Approves Tighter Limits for the Exclusion of
Foreigners, 46 CONG. Q. 1731, June 25, 1988.
63. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1982). Section 212(a)(27) excludes aliens who, based
on the consular officer's or the Attorney General's belief or knowledge, seek to enter
the United States solely to engage in activities that threaten the public interest or en-
danger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States. Id. § 1182(a) (27). Section
212(a)(29) allows the consular officer or the Attorney General to exclude individuals
they have reasonable ground to believe would engage in espionage, sabotage, public
disorder, or other subversive activities after entry; or advocate the unlawful overthrow
of the United States government; or affiliate with any organization that is registered or
required to be registered under section 7 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of
1950. Id. § 1182(a)(29)(A)-(C).
64. Id. § 1182(a)(28)(G)-(H). A study of these sections suggests that labelling sec-
tions (27) and (29) as ideological exclusions may be inappropriate because they do not
explicitly allow for rejections of aliens on the basis of political belief, advocacy, or
affiliation. Tilner, supra note 12, at 66. The author suggests, however, that sections
(27) and (29) are "anticipatory exclusions," because they are based on an alien's likely
future conduct in the United States. Id. at 66-67.
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based simply on the government's perception that their views are anti-
thetical to the mission of, or belief in, the government of the United
States.65 Moreover, the Act as a whole states that the consular officer's
denial of a visa is nonreviewable, and the officer has no duty to reveal
the reasons for denial.66 At least one commentator has suggested that
the lack of duty to notify disregards the due process rights of aliens,
This flaw was partially corrected in 1977, with the passage of the so-
called McGovern Amendment. 8 This legislation provides that the Sec-
retary of State should recommend to the Attorney General that a
waiver be granted to any alien attempting to enter the country, whose
exclusion is based solely on membership or affiliation with one of the
proscribed organizations.6 9 Some observers have applauded the McGov-
ern Amendment as an initial step in revising the law.70 Yet others have
criticized it as a token gesture or a symbolic protection of individual
rights.7 ' The number of challenges to ideological restrictions for entry
65. See Shapiro, supra note 12, at 934 (suggesting that the ideological basis of
sections 212 (a)(27)-(29) results in unconstitutional censorship).
66. See KONVITZ, supra note 11, at 33-39 (describing the procedural provisions of
the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952). Even though the power was nonre-
viewable, prior to the passage of the McGovern amendment, the Attorney General
waived ineligibility under Section 212(a)(28) in nearly all instances. See Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 768 (1972) (including government's brief with table of waivers
from 1967 to 1971). The McGovern Amendment made this waiver virtually
mandatory. McGovern Amendment, Aug. 17, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-105, tit. I, § 112,
91 Stat. 844, 848 (1977) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982)). See infra
notes 67-70 and accompanying text (discussing the McGovern amendment).
67. See KONVITZ, supra note 11, at 46-53 (examining procedural due process is-
sues); see also supra note 8 and infra notes 72-77 and accompanying text (discussing
alien rights).
68. 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982).
69. Id. Congress passed the McGovern Amendment to promote United States com-
pliance with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Id. The Attorney General is not required to waive the restrictions, yet has done so
extensively since passage of the amendment. See Exclusion Hearings, supra note 13, at
61 (revealing in Representative Mazzoli's questioning that, out of 45,900 rejections
based on section 212(a)(28), the Attorney General has issued 45,372 waivers).
The current chairman of the Congressional Committee representing the United
States at the Helsinki Conference, Representative Steny H. Hoyer, has noted that the
Soviet Union and Eastern European countries use sections (27)-(29) as a counterattack
to allegations of human rights violations. Id. at 127-33. See Mieanda, Rethinking the
Role of Politics in United States Immigration Law: The Helsinki Accords and Ideo-
logical Exclusion of Aliens, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 301, 323 (1988) (suggesting there
is a gap between the Immigration and Nationality Act and the principles established at
the Helsinki Conference).
70. Visa Denials, supra note 12, at 260; Shapiro, supra note 12, at 931.
71. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1059 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (com-
menting on dissent's criticism that the Attorney General can deny a visa under section
(a)(28) despite Secretary of State's recommendation to allow alien entry), affid per
curiam, 484 U.S. 1 (1988); Visa Denials, supra note 12, at 261 (noting argument that
compliance with the McGovern Amendment is pro forma); Slovinsky, supra note 12,
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into the United States indicates that the McGovern Amendment waiver
has not effectively resolved the standards for admission or exclusion
into the United States. The law remains a confusing mass of ideological
conditions promulgated at a time when the government was more fear-
ful of foreigners and had a lower tolerance for the first amendment
rights of United States citizens.
II. LEGAL RULINGS ON IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSIONS
The exclusions and delays in admission to the United States under
the McCarran-Walter Act affect a wide range of individuals in a vari-
ety of fields.72 The individuals who challenge the exclusions are often
the American citizens who arranged for the alien's visit and who are
claiming an infringement of their first amendment right to receive in-
formation.7 3 Courts' interpretations of aliens' rights are mixed, and
at 18 (labelling the McGovern Amendment a symbolic protection); see also Tilner,
supra note 12, at 78-79 (charging that the government has frequently circumvented the
McGovern Amendment).
72. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (examining
the exclusions under the McCarran-Walter Act of Nino Pasti, a peace activist and
former member of the Italian Senate; Tomas Borge, Interior Minister of Nicaragua;
and Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodriguez Lezcano, members of the Federation of Cuban
Women), aff'd per curiam, 484 U.S. 1 (1987); Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1113
(1st Cir. 1988) (pertaining to the exclusion by the Department of State of Hortensia
Allende, wife of the former Chilean President because of her membership in two orga-
nizations considered to be affiliated with the Communist party); CAUTE, supra note 2,
at 251-53 (listing scientists, labor leaders, and artists, including Pablo Picasso, who
were excluded shortly after enactment of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950
and which continued with the enactment of the McCarran-WValter Act); Helton, Alien
Exclusion, THE NATioN 737 (May 28, 1988) (describing several exclusions on alleg-
edly political grounds, including Vietnamese economist and former South Vietnamese
Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Oanh, and British Member of Parliament Gerry Ad-
ams); Browne, Author of "'Wolf' Book Barred, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1985, at A14
(reporting detainment of Canadian writer Farley Mowat because of his alleged affilia-
tion with leftist organizations); Hevesi, Belgian Writer Held at Newark Airport as a
Suspected Communist, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1986, at BI (reporting the detainment of
journalist Tom Ronse because communist documents were found in his baggage); State
Department Denies Visa For Ian Paisley, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1983, at L7 (reporting
the visa denial of the Reverend Ian Paisley, a militant Protestant leader from Northern
Ireland to protect the public interest); see also Schapiro, supra note 12, at 30-32 (high-
lighting the exclusion of several international figures, including Italian author Dario
Fo, Nobel laureate Gabriel Garcia Marquez, and dissident South African poet Dennis
Brutus); First Amendment Limitations, supra note 12, at 149 n.9 (listing numerous
exclusions, including Colombian journalist Patricia Lara, right-wing Salvadoran politi-
cian Roberto d'Aubisson, and Irish nationalist Bernadette Devlin).
73. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785
F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (stating that the challenge to the exclusion was
based on a first amendment right to dialogue), affd per curiam, 484 U.S. 1 (1987). In
Abourezk, the Court determined that the plaintiffs, a group of Americans who had
invited several foreigners to visit and challenged the exclusion of those aliens, were not
endowed with a right of action under the McCarran-Walter Act. Id. at 1050. The
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have frequently denied aliens the liberties granted to American citizens
and found in the Bill of Rights.74 Furthermore, courts apply a different
standard for resident aliens as opposed to those trying to enter.75 Aliens
Court held, however, that the plaintiffs could bring suit under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA) because agency action had caused them injury and the APA was
aimed at protecting their interests. Id. at 1050.
In a recent case, the government cancelled a non-immigrant alien student's visa and
prevented him, under section 212(a)(27), from reentering the country for national se-
curity reasons. EI-Werfalli v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The
court found that American citizens had not invited the student to speak. Id. He subse-
quently filed a habeas corpus petition but the court upheld the exclusion, noting that
the government only has to have a facially legitimate reason for its actions. Id. at 153.
74. Compare Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 206-30 (1982) (holding that a Texas
statute that denied free public education to illegal alien children violated the equal
protection clause), reh'g denied 458 U.S. 1131 (1982) and Hampton v. Wong, 426
U.S. 88, 99-117 (1976) (ruling that a Federal Civil Service Commission regulation
barring resident aliens from civil service employment was unconstitutional because it
denied aliens due process) and Graham v. Richardson, 403 US. 365, 370-83 (1971)
(holding that state laws denying welfare benefits to aliens, who have not lived in the
United States for a certain number of years, violate the equal protection clause) and
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-22 (1984) (deciding that a state law prohibiting
aliens from becoming notary publics did not satisfy the strict judicial scrutiny test and
violated the fourteenth amendment) with Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854-57 (1985)
(remanding issue of validity of INS detention of Haitian immigrants to determine pos-
sible discriminatory regulations).
More recently, beyond considerations of national sovereignty and foreign policy,
courts are more willing to grant at least "fundamental rights" to resident aliens. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-16, at 360-61 (1988).
75. See U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8, cl. 4 (granting Congress the power "to establish a
uniform Rule of Naturalization"). Although the Constitution repeatedly uses the word
"citizen," and the Bill of Rights refers exclusively to "persons," not citizens, neither
defined "citizenship" until after the Civil War. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-16 at 355-56.
Congress has periodically conditioned the entry, stay, and naturalization of aliens upon
compliance with requirements that courts would otherwise hold to violate the constitu-
tional rights of American citizens. Id. at 358.
The procedures of naturalization for resident aliens is a judicial process and thus
must meet miminum standards of fairness, while nonresident aliens do not benefit from
any of the individual protections of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 359. The rationale for this
difference in treatment for illegal aliens is based on the Constitution's lack of extrater-
ritorial scope that consequently allows the federal government to utilize the full discre-
tionary power accorded it under international law. Id. at 359 n.30; see Shaughnessy v.
United States, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (distinguishing between procedural safe-
guards given to aliens within the United States and those seeking entry); Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952) (stating that if aliens fail to obtain and maintain
citizenship by proper naturalization processes, they remain subject to the plenary power
of Congress to expel them); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893)
(noting that authority to deport aliens must conform with Constitutional provisions);
see also Immigration and the First Amendment, supra note 12, at 1900 (comparing
the due process rights of aliens in exclusion versus deportation decisions).
But see American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, No. CV 87-02107-
SVW, slip op. at 32-33 n.11 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 26, 1989) (finding for first amend-
ment purposes in a McCarran-Walter deportation action no distinction between immi-
grant and nonimmigrant aliens). In American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,
the district court acknowledged the government's substantial authority to prevent aliens
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seeking admission are granted fewer rights"8 and are more susceptible
to the claims of domestic security or foreign affairs matters under the
McCarran-Walter Act."
A. THE Kleindienst STANDARD
The Supreme Court has generally followed a "hands-off" policy in
matters relating to immigration and the First Amendment7 8 The Court
from entering the United States, but noted the important differences in this power in
the exclusion and deportation contexts. Id. at 35-36. The court pointed out that even in
those cases in which the government's deportation power was affirmed, such power
must conform to the Constitution. Id. at 34-35. The court ruled that there is no differ-
ent Bill of Rights for aliens in the deportation setting. Id. at 42-46. Furthermore, the
district court contrasted Congress' powerful plenary immigration power in the substan-
tive due process area with a lesser power in the first amendment field. Id. at 39, 46-48.
The court suggested that the Government's view, that aliens are free to say whatever
they wish but the Government maintains the ability to deport them for the content of
their speech, was just as chilling to speech as initially disallowing the speech. Id. at 48.
One critic of the California district court's decision suggested that since deportation is
not a criminal punishment, Judge Wilson erred in applying the Brandenburg free
speech restraints on criminal prosecutions to deportations. Fein, Free Speech Sanctuary
for Terrorists, Wash. Times, Jan. 31, 1989, at Fl. The author suggested that prevent-
ing the fundraising for a "terrorist organization" that the plaintiffs were charged with
did not in any way resemble the potential first amendment violation of wearing a PFLP
button which the judge in the case compared it to. Id. at F4.
76. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950)
(affirming that the Attorney General may exclude from the United States, without a
hearing, the alien wife of a citizen who had served honorably in the United States
forces during World War II). The Court noted that although Congress normally sup-
plies the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United States, it may in broad
terms authorize the executive to exercise the power in the best interests of the country
during a time of national emergency. Id. at 543. The dissenters challenged the lack of
procedural due process without questioning the majority's characterization of the Con-
gressional power. Id. at 550 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
One commentator suggests that the standard of due process for all aliens and all
citizens should be identical. Immigration and the First Amendment, supra note 12, at
1926-28; see also infra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing the due process
rights of aliens in current legislative reforms in this area).
77. See Exclusion Hearings, supra note 12, at 60 (noting State Department legal
adviser Abraham Sofaer's view that courts should not question whether excluding or
admitting an alien has a serious adverse impact on our foreign policy or national secur-
ity). At least one committee has criticized a foreign policy rationale as one without
legal basis. Visa Denials, supra note 12, at 255.
78. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792-96 (1977) (discussing the limited scope of
judicial review inquiry into immigration legislation); Immigration and the First
Amendment, supra note 12, at 1898 (summarizing the Supreme Court's review process
regarding first amendment and immigration issues); Note, Selective Enforcement of
Immigration Laws on the Basis of Nationality as an Instrument of Foreign Policy, 56
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 704, 708-12 (1981) (examining judicial review of the immigra-
tion power); Immigration Law: The Role of the Supreme Court in Policy Develop-
ment, 22 NEw ENG. L. REv. 131, 140-46 (1987) (discussing the limited scope of judi-
cial review in immigration law); see also Gibney, The Role of the Judiciary in Alien
Admissions, 8 B.C. Ir'L CAmp. L. REV. 341, 366-74 (1985) (examining the establish-
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initially established a basic precedent in Kleindienst v. Mandel.7
Kleindienst was the first case since the Court's 1903 decision in United
States ex rel. Turner v. Williams" to address the government's exclu-
sion of a person on ideological grounds. 81 In Kleindienst, the plaintiffs
were United States citizens who challenged the denial of a visa to Er-
nest Mandel, a Belgian socialist newspaper editor, under section
212(a)(28) of the McCarran-Walter Act.82 The plaintiffs claimed the
Act violated their right to receive information and to associate with
whom they chose.83 The Supreme Court upheld the visa denial,
stressing the importance of legislative prerogative in foreign affairs
matters.84 The Court acknowledged the first amendment issues raised
in the case," yet declined to conduct a balancing test because the exec-
utive branch had denied the visa on "facially legitimate and bona fide"
grounds.86 The Court suggested that basing the decision on first
ment of judicial deference to the political branches of government and arguing for
increased judicial activism in immigration matters). But see Comment, National Ori-
gin as a Retaliatory Weapon in Foreign Policy: The Iranian Students Cases, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 993, 1007-08 (1980) [hereinafter Iranian Student Cases] (not-
ing the disturbing ramifications resulting from courts' decisions affirming a narrow
standard of review in immigration law).
79. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
80. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
81. Id. at 292-93. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the Turner
case).
82. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 759 (1972).
83. Id. at 762-63. Mandel was an original party to the suit along with six Ameri-
cans but was denied standing. Id. at 760. The Court established that an alien has no
standing to bring a constitutional challenge to the denial of a visa. Id. at 762. The
government had admitted Mandel on two earlier occasions, based on the Secretary of
State's recommendation that the Attorney General waive the McCarran-Walter Act
prohibition. Id. at 756. The government claimed that Mandel violated the terms of his
earlier visa by engaging in fundraising activities. Id. at 758 n.5. Although Mandel was
prosecuted under anti-Communist statutes, he asserted on his visa applications that he
was not a member of the Communist party. Id. at 756. He did not dispute, however,
that he advocated the doctrines of world communism. Id.
84. Id. at 765-67. The Court adopted Justice Frankfurter's reasoning from Galvan
v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530-32 (1954), that courts should adhere to the traditional
approach of deferring to Congressional power in legal matters relating to aliens. Klein-
dienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767 (1972).
85. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 608 U.S. 753, 765 (1972). The Court noted that mere
recognition of first amendment rights was not dispositive of an inquiry. Id. at 765-66. A
deprivation must be measured against the historical role of Congress in determining the
admission and exclusion of aliens to the United States. Id.
86. Id. at 770. The Court summarized by noting that under section 212(a)(28),
Congress delegated conditional exercise of the power of exclusion to the executive. Id.
Members of the executive branch need only demonstrate that the exclusion was based
on facially legitimate and bona fide reasons. Id. If this test is met, courts will not
engage in further discretion or balancing of interests. Id.
The dissenters challenged this position. Id. at 770-85. Justice Douglas took a strict
position that the government has no authority to restrain free discussion. Id. at 776
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amendment grounds would allow all aliens to be admitted and would
consequently transform Congress's plenary power into a "nullity."87
The Court's opinion also stressed that application of a balancing test
would unnecessarily clog the courts with individual reviews of exclusion
decisions.88
B. APPLYING THE Kleindienst STANDARD
The lower courts have had difficulty in consistently interpreting and
applying the Kleindienst standard. In Abourezk v. Reagan,89 United
States citizens challenged the denial of non-immigrant visas under sec-
tion 212(a)(27) of the McCarran-Walter Act to a number of individu-
als including: Tomas Borge, the Interior Minister of Nicaragua; Nino
Pasti, a former Italian Senator, NATO general and peace activist with
the World Peace Council; and Olga Finlay and Leonor Rodriguez Lez-
cano, Cuban women who are experts on status of women and family
law in Cuba.90 Following the Supreme Court's analysis in Kleindienst,
the circuit court decided the case based on statutory interpretation
rather than constitutional issues.9x The court never expressly invoked
the Kleindienst standard, instead basing its ruling on the government's
(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall acknowledged that government has the
power to restrict first amendment rights, however, only if the restriction is necessary to
further a compelling governmental interest, such as public health or national security.
Id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Merely legitimate governmental interests did not
permit intrusion on constitutional rights. Id. at 777. Furthermore, Justice Marshall
criticized the Court's good faith standard, suggesting that such complete deference to
the executive was unprecedented. Id. at 777. Justice Marshall found no justification for
a rule that refuses to evaluate the Attorney General's reasoning for denying individuals
admission to the United States. Id. at 778.
Some courts use the Kleindienst standard to allow seemingly limitless government
attempts to deny visas. See, e.g., NGO Comm. on Disarmament v. Haig, No. 82 Civ.
3636 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1982), aff'd mem., 697 F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1982). In NGO, the
Secretary of State recommended a waiver under the McGovern Amendment for 320
Japanese aliens affiliated with the World Peace Council, an organization the United
States government perceived as affiliated with communism. Id. The district court up-
held the Attorney General's rationale as a valid reason for denial of a waiver. Id.
87. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 768 (1972). The Court noted that al-
though few aliens are influential or popular as Mandel, the first amendment extends to
all aliens. Id. at 768.
88. Id. at 769.
89. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1986), a ffd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987)
(per curiam).
90. Id. at 1048-49. The plaintiffs had invited the excluded individuals to the United
States to attend meetings and present lectures. Id. at 1047.
91. Id. at 1052. Although the plaintiffs did have the right to challenge the constitu-
tional basis of the State Department's application of § 1182(a)(27), the Court's ruling
never reached the constitutional question. Id. at 1051-52.
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failure to properly interpret and implement the existing statutes.9 2
First, the court noted that although Congress intended foreign policy
concerns to fall within the legitimate authority of section 212(a)(27),9"
the trial court failed to elaborate whether the prohibition applied only
to an alien's mere presence in the United States or to an alien's activi-
ties.9 "4 The court proceeded to evaluate Congressional intent through an
examination of the legislative history of the McCarran-Walter Act and
the McGovern Amendment.95 Next, the court ruled that the govern-
ment's use of section 212(a)(27) instead of section 212(a)(28) to ex-
clude individuals effectively avoided the limitations of the McGovern
Amendment.9" Finally, the court criticized the lower district court for
its heavy reliance on in camera evidence because this type of evaluation
harms the openness and fairness of judicial proceedings.97
The dissenting opinion in the circuit court in Abourezk, by Judge
Robert Bork, concluded that the statute permitted the government's ac-
tions.98 The dissent, in recognizing the constitutional challenge, con-
cluded that the foreign policy interest of the government outweighed
the liberty rights of those denied the right to hear the aliens' message. 9
Furthermore, the dissent disagreed with the circuit court's decision to
remand the case to the district court.100 The dissent found ample sup-
port in the legislative history of the McCarran-Walter Act, the Internal
92. Id. at 1053-60.
93. Id. at 1053.
94. Id. at 1053-54. The Court remanded the case and recommended that the gov-
ernment present more substantive evidence that section 212(a)(27) permits the exclu-
sion of aliens based on presence alone and allow plaintiffs to challenge such evidence.
Id. at 1056.
95. Id. at 1054-56.
96. Id. at 1056-57. The intent of Congress in passing the McGovern Amendment
was to encourage the Secretary of State to recommend a waiver of ineligibility. Id. at
1057; see supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing the McGovern
Amendment).
97. Id. at 1060-61. Although the court in Abourezk criticized the lower court's
use of in camera evidence, such evidence was relied upon in earlier cases. EI-Werfalli v.
Smith, 547 F. Supp. 152, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In El-Werfalli, the court upheld a
Libyan student's exclusion after examining classified documents, applying the Klein-
dienst standard, and concluding that the government's decision was facially legitimate
and bona fide. Id. at 154. The court in El-Werfalli reasoned that the government's
belief, that petitioner's employment at an aeronautics school was threatening to the
United States security, was a valid premise for exclusion. Id. at 154. The court noted
the government's authority to employ all legal means to further national politics. Id.
But see NGO Committee v. Haig, No. 82 Civ. 3636 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 1982) (ruling
that it was unnecessary to examine the in camera classified evidence), affid mem., 697
F.2d 294 (2d Cir. 1982).
98. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1063 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissent-
ing), afl'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1064.
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Security Act of 1950, and the McGovern Amendment of 1977, to
render the judiciary's role in considering foreign relations virtually un-
necessary. 01 Finally, the dissent suggested that the executive branch
may exclude aliens for any reasons it desires, including political rea-
sons, if it finds that the admission of these aliens would be
dangerous.0 2
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied the Kleindienst
standard in Allende v. Shultz'0 3 but the court found that the govern-
ment failed to advance a sound basis for exclusion.'" In Allende,
United States citizens who had extended speaking invitations to the
widow of the former Chilean president brought an action to contest the
denial to her of a non-immigrant visa. °05 The government denied her a
visa on the grounds that her entry violated section 212(a)(27) of the
McCarran-Walter Act. 0 6 The district court granted the plaintiffs' mo-
tion for summary judgment on the grounds that the government failed
to advance a sound basis for exclusion under the section.'" In affirming
this ruling, the court of appeals expanded on the lower court judgment,
clarifying the notion that the intent of Congress was to prohibit only
101. Id. at 1064-73. Judge Bork stated that there is a heavy presumption that Con-
gress meant the same thing in the McCarran-Walter Act as it did in the Internal
Security Act when it incorporated the latter law into the former. Id. at 1064. Judge
Bork pointed to the House and Senate reports on the respective bills, that state that
excludable aliens are those who seek to enter the United States for injurious purposes.
Id.
102. Id. at 1068-69. The dissent chastised the plaintiffs for inaccurately catego-
rizing the government's conduct as content-based censorship. Id. It argued instead that
the government based its prohibition on the individual views because these individuals
had associations with a particular foreign government. Id.
103. Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111 (1st Cir. 1986).
104. Id. at 1116.
105. Id. at 1113-14. The government barred Mrs. Allende under section
212(a)(27) because of her affiliation with the World Peace Council (WVPC) and the
Women's International Democratic Federation (WDF), organizations that the State
Department treats as international fronts for the Communist party of the Soviet Union.
Id. at 1113.
106. Id. at 1113-14. In a memo detailing the two reasons for Mrs. Allende's ineligi-
bility, Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger referred to her membership in,
and attendance at, a conference of the World Peace Council, as well as his official
determination that Allende's entry was potentially harmful to the United States foreign
policy interests Id. at 1114.
107. Allende v. Shultz, No. 83-3984-C (D. Mass. Mar. 31, 1987) (WESTLANV,
DCT database, 1987 WL 9764), afd 845 F.2d I1111 (st Cir. 1986). The Massachu-
setts District Court, applying the Kleindienst standard, found that the purely con-
clusory rationale of the government was not valid. Id. The court found that the govern-
ment did not meet its burden of proof because it failed to advance a facially legitimate
and bona fide reason for exclusion, as required by Kleindienst. Id. at 7-8. The court
refused to review in camera evidence submitted to the court and not for publication. Id.
at 6-7. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text (describing the Kleindienst
decision).
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
action and not entry.108 Furthermore, the court made a special ruling
that the case was not moot, thus recognizing the need to decide the
issue in the case even though the government had already issued a visa
to Mrs. Allende after the court action had begun. 1 9
In Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz,110 the Massachusetts Dis-
trict Court addressed many of the same issues of speech, foreign policy,
and potential danger from visiting aliens that were raised in Allende.
This court, however, departed from the application of the Kleindienst
standard,1 ' adding a balancing test to its determination.' 12 In Harvard
Forum, the government refused to permit Zuhdi Labib Terzi, the
United Nations representative to the observer mission of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), to attend a debate on Middle Eastern
policy at Harvard Law School. 1 3 The district court granted an injunc-
108. Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1119-20 (Ist Cir. 1986). The court pointed
out that each section of the law had its own purpose, and the Government had effec-
tively merged sections 212(a)(27) and (28). Id. at 1118. The court differed with the
Abourezk decision, finding an examination of the Act's legislative history unnecessary.
Id. at 1119.
109. Allende v. Shultz, 624 F. Supp. 1063, 1066 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding that
because it is the government's policy of applying the particular exclusionary category
to Mrs. Allende, and not simply the denial of her visa in this instance, the case is not
moot); see Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1115 n.7 (1st Cir. 1986) (raising the
mootness issue sua sponte).
110. Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp. 525 (D. Mass. 1986).
111. See id. at 531-32 (noting the court's use of a test balancing the public interest
in preserving free speech against the adverse effect that preventing a PLO representa-
tive a forum will have on the public).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 526. The parties agreed that the representative, Zuhdi Labib Terzi, as a
member of the PLO, is an excludable alien under section 212(a)(28)(F) of the McCar-
ran-Walter Act, which prohibits the issuance of visas to those who advocate sabotage,
the unlawful destruction of property, or the justification of assaulting or killing any
officer of an organized government because of his official character. 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(a)(28)(f)(ii-v)(l & 87). Furthermore, the United States will not recognize or negoti-
ate with the PLO until that group recognizes Israel's right to exist and endorses United
Nations Resolutions 242 and 338. United States Memorandum of Agreement with
Israel (1975), SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SEARCH FOR
PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, DOCUMENTS AND STATEMENTS, 1967-79 H.R. Doc. No.
CP-957. 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1979). This policy was reaffirmed six years later.
International Security and Cooperation Development Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99-83, §
1302(b), 99 Stat. 280, Codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (Supp. IV. 1986). This relation-
ship is currently in transition following United States approval of PLO statements pur-
portedly recognizing Israel and agreeing to United Nations Resolutions 242 and 338.
Pear, U.S. Agrees to Talks with PLO Saying Arafat Accepts Israel and Renounces
Terrorism, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1988, at Al.
Notwithstanding United States policy regarding the PLO, United Nations personnel
are allowed access to the headquarters in New York. United Nations Headquarters
Agreement, June 26, 1947, art. iv, 17 U.S.T. 74, T.I.A.S. No. 5961, 11 U.N.T.S. 147.
The United States has complied with this agreement by restricting travel of members
of the PLO's observer mission to the United Nations to a 25 mile geographic limitation
from the center of Manhattan. Harvard Law School Forum v. Shultz, 633 F. Supp.
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tion in favor of Harvard Law School, finding that the debate's or-
ganizers would suffer irreparable harm if the debate could not take
place, that the potential harm of allowing the speech outweighed the
harm to the government, and that there would be no adverse effect to
the public interest in allowing the debate to proceed. 4 While the court
adopted the "legitimate and bona fide" standard of Kleindienst, it
found that the government had met only half of its burden of proof. 16
The court reasoned that although the Secretary of State's rationale for
not issuing the visa to Terzi was bona fide, it was not facially legiti-
mate. 6 It found that the decision to deny the travel request was based
solely on the content of Terzi's speech.1
A case currently pending before the courts, Randall v. Meese,28
reveals the subjectivity of the exclusionary determination, even when
the official rendering the decision to exclude applies the Kleindienst
standard. In Randall, the government denied Margaret J. Randall, a
professor and writer, a change in her visa status from temporary to
permanent resident.1 9 Randall challenged the denial of her status ad-
525, 527 (D. Mass. 1986). In Harvard Forum, the Assistant Secretary of State argued
that the specific decision at issue was a discretionary political matter, and that, as the
highest ranking official of the PLO in this country, the denial of Terzi's right to travel
was not subject to judicial review. Id. at 527.
114. Id. at 530-32.
115. Id. at 531.
116. Id. at 531-32.
117. Id. The court ruled that because the government previously allowed Terzi to
go beyond the 25 mile radius required under the United Nations Headquarters Agree-
ment for vacations, his travel could not be restricted to stop him from speaking at the
forum. Id. at 527.
118. Randall v. Meese, No. 85-3415 (D.D.C. June 5, 1987) (WESTLAW DCT
database, 1987 WL 12570), ard, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
119. Id. Randall's change of status was prohibited under the section of the McCar-
ran-Walter Act that includes advocacy to organized government or affiliation with the
Communist party. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(28)(G) (1987). Randall was born an American
citizen but in 1967 lost her citizenship when she declared her allegiance to Mexico.
Randall v. Meese, No. 85-3415 (D.D.C. June 5, 1987), affid, 854 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir.
1988). In 1984, she entered the United States on a visitor's visa and joined her family
in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where she took residence. Id. She married a United
States citizen, began to teach at the University of New Mexico, and sought an adjust-
ment of her immigration status to that of a permanent resident to regain her United
States citizenship. Id. In the initial deportation proceeding, the district director found
Randall excludable because of the ideas and opinions expressed in her writings, and
ordered her to leave the United States. Id. Following the expiration of this order, the
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) issued an order for her to show cause
why it should not deport her. Id. The immigration judge surveyed Randall's activities
and writings abroad and pointed to her glorification of the North Vietnamese victory
and her active backing of the Castro Communist revolution as reasons for denying her
the change of visa status. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The
judge noted that even though the applicant appeared to be statutorily eligible for a
status change under 8 U.S.C. § 1255, he denied the change. Id. at 478; see also Cole,
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justment on the grounds that she suffered irreparable harm, including
infringement of her first and fifth amendment freedoms.1 20 The district
court denied her application for preliminary relief'2' and the Court of
Appeals declined to review Randall's challenge, stating that she had
not yet exhausted her administrative remedies. 22 Furthermore, the
court noted that if Randall followed the proper procedures for appeal
she could then qualify for permanent status because of a temporary
amendment to the Immigration Act. 23
A recent decision by a California district court addressed the depor-
tation provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act, concluding that the
government could not deport members of the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) simply because that organization advo-
cated the economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world
communism or published material about their goals. 24 The court found
that aliens within the United States are protected by the first amend-
ment and not subject to the same congressional plenary power in the
immigration area as those foreigners attempting to enter the country. 20
Deportation of a Poet, THE NATION, 892 (June 25, 1988) (describing the case of Mar-
garet Randall).
120. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Randall sought declar-
atory and injunctive relief that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(G) and (C) were unconstitu-
tional. Id.
121. Id. Although alleged abuses by a district director may be reviewable in district
court, the Supreme Court, in Kleindienst v. Mandel, upheld the constitutionality of
section 212(a)(28) that relates to exclusion on the basis of individuals' political beliefs.
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972).
122. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1988). The court stated that
if Randall was correct that the district director did definitively find her "not excludable
under either 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28)(G) or (C), the rest of her argument would be
more forceful." Id. at 479. The court found this determination by the district director
to be unclear. Id.
123. Id. at 481; see infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text (describing the tem-
porary statutory change allowing Randall and others excluded under sections
212(a)(27)-(29) to enter or remain in the United States). The court suggested, but did
not endorse, the argument that the temporary change in the law should apply retroac-
tively. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
124. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, No. CV 87-02107-
SVW slip op. at 45 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1989). In January of 1987 the INS commenced
deportation proceedings against eight individuals who it charged with being members
of or affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Id. at 5-
6. Although the initial charges were dropped, new charges were brought against two of
the individuals under Section 241(a)(6)(F)(iii) of the McCarran-Walter Act, while the
others were charged with non-ideological immigration violations under 8 U.S.C. §
1251(a)(2) and (a)(9). Id. at 6. The court held that the plaintiffs had standing on the
grounds that they faced a real and immediate threat of deportation. Id. at 30-31.
125. Id. at 33-37. The court stressed that while the government has certain plenary
powers to control immigration, aliens within the borders of the United States who the
government is attempting to deport are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights,
thus limiting the government's power. Id. at 33-37, 42-49. The court refused to differ-
[VOL. 4:443
IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION PROVISIONS
Moreover, the court applied these first amendment principles and found
the McCarran-Walter deportation provisions to be substantially over-
broad in violation of the first amendment. 26
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The judicial branch of the government has exercised a narrow stan-
dard of review on cases involving immigration law. 21 A court's deter-
mination may involve application of a previously determined standard,
like the one adopted by the Supreme Court in Kleindienst,1 2 or it may
utilize an examination of a statute's legislative history.129 As the previ-
ous cases indicate, however, courts have great difficulty in strictly or
consistently following either of these methods.1 30 Furthermore, courts
entiate between nonimmigrant aliens and permanent resident aliens; see id. at 32-33 n.
11 (following Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982), in which the Court held that a
statute denying state funds for school districts who allow illegal aliens to attend their
schools is a violation of the Equal Protection clause); United States v. Verdugo-Ur-
quidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that the protection of the fourth
amendment extends to the government's search of a Mexican national's United States
residence); see also supra note 75 (discussing alien rights).
126. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, No. CV 87-02107-
SVW slip op. at 49-53 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1989). The court applied the prevailing first
amendment test, adopted in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969), which
allows the government to only prohibit advocacy "directed to inciting or producing im-
minent lawless action and. . .likely to incite or produce such action." Id. at 51. Under
this standard, the court found all of the deportation provisions dealing with ideology to
be overbroad; see id. at 52-53 (finding sections 241(a)(6)(G)(v), (H), (D), and (F)(iii)
unconstitutional because they punish mere publication, teaching, advocacy, and
affiliation).
127. See supra notes 7 and 74-78 and accompanying text (examining the history of
judicial review in immigration law).
128. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 768 (1972); see supra note 86 and ac-
companying text (describing the "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard).
129. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1986), afT'd, 484 U.S. 1
(1988) (per curiam); see Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REv. 526, 533 (1947) (examining theories of statutory interpretation).
130. Exclusion Hearings, supra note 13, at 63. One subject of the debate in the
hearings to reform the McCarran-Walter Act addressed the growing tendency of
courts to exercise judicial review. Id. Representative Barney Frank suggested that the
court held in the Allende decision that American citizens who invite aliens into the
United States to address public audiences have standing to challenge an exclusion. Id.
In addressing this point, Frank noted the potential danger when a court decides
whether a legitimate foreign policy argument exists. Id.
There is a mixture of opinion on whether courts should be more or less active in
setting policy in this area. Compare Gibney, supra note 78, at 366-74 (arguing for
increased judicial activism in immigration matters) and Immigration and the First
Amendment, supra note 12, at 1928 (arguing that the Supreme Court should abandon
the special rule it adopted for immigration cases and apply first amendment principles
as it does in other areas of the law) with Martin, Due Process and Membership in the
National Community: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. PiTr. L. REv. 165, 211
(1983) (arguing that immigration matters have political consequences with which
1989] 469
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
in numerous circumstances have held that the executive branch ex-
ceeded its power to exclude aliens for foreign policy or national security
reasons.131 In other decisions, however, courts have upheld the execu-
tive branch and departed from the standard defined by the Supreme
Court.'32
The source of many of these problems is the standard set in Klein-
dienst. The "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard is difficult for
lower courts to apply consistently when evaluating clashes between im-
migration restrictions and first amendment freedoms. 33 In Kleindienst,
the Supreme Court applied the principles articulated in Turner v. Wil-
liams3 4 and those in other cases that address only the issue of alien
rights.' 35 This eliminated guidance for lower courts on the first amend-
ment question and also provided an anachronistic rationale for allowing
the government to exclude individuals in general.' 36 Furthermore, the
courts should not or cannot deal).
The deportation of Iranian students from the United States, in response to the taking
of American hostages by Iran, raises similar questions on the political use of exclusions
and deportations. Compare id. (suggesting that courts should not make policy on immi-
gration matters) with Iranian Student Cases, supra note 78, at 1010 (suggesting that
courts not succumb to a less rigorous review of immigration policy which might in-
fringe upon constitutional rights).
131. See supra notes 89-117 and accompanying text (discussing Abourezk, Allende
and Harvard Law Forum). One commentator has suggested that the United States
government's foreign policy goals result in a lack of objective fact-finding by the courts.
Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17
MICH. J. L. REFORM 243, 253-54 (1984).
132. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text (describing Randall v.
Meese).
133. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (setting the standard for
the government's authority to exclude aliens without addressing first amendment ques-
tions directly). Several commentators have noted the ambiguity of Kleindienst. See
Shapiro, supra note 12, at 936 (exploring different interpretations of Kleindienst and
their effect on the first amendment); Visa Denials, supra note 12, at 263 (charging that
Kleindienst does not resolve the first amendment issues); First Amendment Limita-
tions, supra note 8, at 163 (noting that Kleindienst leaves unanswered many questions
in this area of law).
134. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
135. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 763-69 (1972).
136. Id. With the judicial expansion of first amendment rights, the Turner stan-
dard is outdated. First Amendment Limitations, supra note 8, at 161 n.89. This idea
follows from Justice Marshall's dissenting argument in Kleindienst stating that overrul-
ing earlier cases is not necessary to strike down Kleindienst's exclusion, because none
of the earlier exclusion cases were concerned with American citizens' expanded right to
receive information. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 782 (1972) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). One historian has suggested that because Turner was treated not as a resi-
dent alien, but rather as one trying to get in, the situation might not even arise today
because of the existence of the visa system. KONVlTZ, supra note 11, at 38. Another
writer has suggested that the Court's reliance in Kleindienst on cases like the Chinese
Exclusion case is equivalent to reliance on the Dred Scott decision (in that it repre-
sents a case so dated as to be obsolete). Shapiro, supra note 12, at 942.
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Court failed to establish guidelines for the government to follow when
restricting first amendment rights.137 Restricting this right is necessary
only when furthering a compelling governmental interest.'3 Finally,
the Court in Kleindienst failed to address the broader underlying con-
flict between the first amendment and the ideological exclusion provi-
sion of the Immigration Act. 3 '
Recent lower court decisions point to the failure of the Kleindienst
standard to strike the balance between the first amendment and na-
tional security.140 These courts have adapted or rejected entirely this
"standard," a conclusion that undermines congressional intent and the
spirit of Supreme Court decisions. The appeals court in Reagan v.
Abourezk, like the Supreme Court in Kleindienst, failed to resolve the
first amendment question, leaving no clear standard for determining
the balance between free speech and foreign policy.141 It declined to
formulate any test, preferring to interpret the case through statutory
intent and legislative history, 14  an approach that is troublesome and
helps to continue the confusion that stems from the Kleindienst opin-
ion. Furthermore, the court's reliance on the in camera evidentiary
privilege14 3 furthers the potential for a closed legal system, eliminating
both the appearance and reality of fairness in adjudications in the
United States.
The Abourezk opinion was equally revealing in its discussion and
conflicting interpretations of a legislative history that dates back more
than thirty-five years.14' The McGovern Amendment was an attempt to
eliminate some of the unilateral decision-making power of the executive
branch.43 But the dissent in Abourezk provides a vivid example of the
137. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 777 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
138. See id. at 777 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that merely "legitimate" gov-
ernmental interest cannot override constitutional rights).
139. Id. at 779. Justice Marshall distinguished section 212(a)(28) allowing exclu-
sions from membership in the Communist party, from sections 212(a)(27) and (29),
exclusions on the basis of activities prejudicial to the public interest and which Mar-
shall said addressed subversive action and not ideas. Id. at 780.
140. See supra notes 89-124 and accompanying text (examining the Abourezk, Al-
lende, Randall, and Harvard Forum cases in detail).
141. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986), afld, 484 U.S. I
(1987) (per curiam).
142. Id. at 1054-55. The Court stressed that a statutory interpretation rather than
a constitutional confrontation was mandated if at all possible. Id. at 1052.
143. Id. at 1061-62.
144. See supra notes 91-102 and accompanying text (examining judicial interpreta-
tions of the legislative intent of the McCarran-Walter Act).
145. McGovern Amendment, Aug. 17, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-105, tit. I, § 112, 91
Stat. 844, 848 (1977) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2691 (1982)); see supra
notes 68-71 and accompanying text (describing the rationale behind the passage of the
McGovern Amendment).
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difficulty courts have in consistently interpreting this legislative his-
tory.""6 Judge Bork's opinion points out, from both a political as well as
a legal analysis, many of the potential misconceptions and misinterpre-
tations of the McCarran-Walter Act that come from interpreting such
a vaguely worded and misinterpreted legislative history.147 It further
demonstrates the need for a standard that clearly differentiates from
the fervently anti-immigration standard of forty years ago.148 Thus,
even if courts today addressed the first amendment question, as Judge
Bork did in his dissent in Abourezk14 9 they would do so in error,
through application of these archaic standards.
The district court in Harvard Forum further interpreted the holding
of the Supreme Court in Kleindienst through the addition of a balanc-
ing test to the simple "facially legitimate and bona fide" standard.0 0
146. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissent-
ing), affd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam). Although the statutory interpretation is
understood to be a part of most courts' legal analyses, determining legislative intent is
often subjective, and rarely resolves specific issues. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION DECIDING APPEALS 522-33 (1960) (reproducing several different in-
terpretations of the same statutes to demonstrate the contradictory meanings statutes
may have); Neuborne, Observations on Weber, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 546, 553 (1979)
(examining United Steelworker v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and the Court's statu-
tory analysis). The author suggests that the concept of legislative intent is not discern-
ible except by "the judges who claim to have deciphered it." Id.
147. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054-55 n.11, 1058-59 n.19-22 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam) (noting the discussion of the errors in
the dissent's analysis).
148. Id. The Abourezk case raised two major issues: first, the lack of evidence by
the government and second, the avoidance of the waiver provision of the McGovern
Amendment. Id. at 1056-59. The later issue arises when the government excludes an
individual under the category of "prejudicial to the public interest" instead of the cate-
gory allowing exclusions based on membership in the Communist Party. Id. at 1056-59.
The dissent would allow the government to prevail on both issues based on legislative
intent authorizing the executive's discretion. Id. at 1064-66, 1068-74 (Bork, J., dissent-
ing). The legislative documents accompanying the McCarran-Walter Act and the Mc-
Govern Amendment indicate, however, an alternative interpretation: first, through tak-
ing into account the mood of the period in which Congress created these laws, and
second by examining different documents of the same period, that indicate that section
212(a)(27) applies only to the prohibition of activities and not to simple expression. See
First Amendment Limitations, supra note 8, at 172 (comparing Senate and Conference
Committee Reports and evaluating the statements of Senator McCarran to find that
there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the section applies only to activities). This
interpretation comports with other decisions of that time. See supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text (discussing the Yates decision and its impact).
149. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1074-76 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 484 U.S. 1 (per curiam) (describing the problematic nature of apply-
ing outdated legislative history). One commentator argues that courts should allow lim-
ited judicial review of exclusion decisions, suggesting that application of this standard
would not hamper important governmental interests. Immigration and the First
Amendment, supra note 12, at 1925.




Such an expansion indicates the potential willingness of courts to in-
crease the weight given to first amendment rights, particularly as these
rights expand in other areas of the law. 51 At the same time, however,
this approach further defines the problems of intertwining the vague
standard articulated in the McCarran-Walter Act, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of it in Kleindienst, and the importance of gov-
ernmental and national security interests.'52
The need for a clearer standard for interpreting the McCarran-Wal-
ter Act in the light of first amendment questions also was evident in the
ruling in Allende v. Shultz. 15 3 In this case, the court criticized the
court in Abourezk for examining the legislative history of the statute
and the administrative agency practice."" Instead, in Allende, the
court's determination was made solely from an interpretation of the
statute; a determination that the language of the statute conclusively
differentiates between status-based and conduct-based ineligibility.,'
Moreover, in criticizing the government's use of the McCarran-Walter
Act, the court noted that anticipation of post-entry activity, as the gov-
ernment claimed, would render superfluous the language of the section
permitting exclusion on the grounds that entry would be prejudicial to
the public interest. 5
Finally, the court's raising of the issue on its own initiative demon-
strates its importance. 57 Although Mrs. Allende had already received
her visa to enter the United States, the court decided to hear the case
in order to have the opportunity to define a clearer standard for settling
151. Id.; see supra note 4, 8-9 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court
decisions that have expanded first amendment freedoms).
152. See First Amendment Limitations, supra note 8, at 168 (examining the differ-
ences between the Harvard Forum and Allende cases).
153. Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1113 (1st Cir. 1988).
154. Id. at 1119.
155. Id. at 1120-21.
156. Id. at 1117. The court noted that it failed to understand how an alien can
enter the country to engage in the act of entry. Id.
157. Id. at 1115 n.7. The court stated that although Mrs. Allende received a visa
after the consideration of the motion to dismiss for mootness by the court below, the
validity of the policy in general remains controversial. Id.
A similar debate with different results occurred in the Supreme Court more than
twenty years earlier. Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 380 U.S. 513, 513 (1965). In Veterans of Abraham Lincoln Brigade, the
Court found that the record relating to events from a 1950 prosecution under the Inter-
nal Security Act was stale, and dismissed the case without ruling on the issue. Id. at
513-14. The dissent in that case suggested, however, that the court should address the
issue, noting that the controversy is a real one and the present record includes all of the
factors necessary to resolve the constitutional question. Id. at 514 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
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future cases.' 58 Different analyses among courts that presumably try to
measure government action by the same law and judicial standard
point to the misunderstanding and lack of clarity of both the McCar-
ran-Walter Act and the Kleindienst ruling.
IV. CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS TO REFORM THE
MCCARRAN-WALTER ACT
Critics of the McCarran-Walter Act have issued numerous calls for
its reform or abolishment since the Act's passage.1 9 The enactment of
the McGovern Amendment in 1977 remedied some of the weaknesses
of the immigration law.' 60 This change, however, also accentuated
many of the remaining problems and the need for further reform. 61
A. THE FRANK BILL
In response to the clamor for change in the exclusionary provisions of
the Immigration Act, Representative Barney Frank introduced H.R.
4427.182 The bill reduced the number of exclusionary provisions and
clarified language in many areas. 16 3 These changes included, among
others, the creation of a specific health-related section, 64 and the aboli-
tion of the exclusionary provisions for retarded or insane individuals. 05
More importantly, however, the legislation proposed to abolish sections
158. Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1113 (1st Cir. 1988).
159. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (describing criticism of the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act).
160. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (examining the McGovern
Amendment).
161. JOINT COMM. PRINT, No. 8, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 333-48 (1981). The report
of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy examined a variety of
possible changes in United States immigration policy, including revising the current
exclusionary grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Id. Several of the com-
missioners criticized the recommendation as incomplete. See id. at 348-423 (including
supplemental statements of Commissioners Hesburgh, Holtzman, Kennedy, Ochi and
Simpson). One commission member offered a detailed proposal to change the ideologi-
cal exclusions law. See id. at 348-56 (including statement of Representative Elizabeth
Holtzman); see also Visa Denials, supra note 12, at 261-62 (calling for legislative re-
dress); Shapiro, supra note 12, at 931 (calling for a revision of the outdated structure
of the McCarran-Walter Act).
162. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation Amendments of 1988, H.R. 4427,
[hereinafter H.R. 4427] 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 184 CONG. REc. 34,540 (1987). The
bill was originally introduced in 1987 as H.R. 1119, however, it was amended in the
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law and given a new bill
number. Id. The bill was substantially revised in the full Judiciary Committee. See
infra notes 192-210 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing the revised bill).
163. H.R. 4427, supra note 162.
164. Id. § 2(a)(1).
165. Compare id. with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l)-(8) (1982) (noting the absence of
certain restrictions in H.R. 4427).
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of the McCarran-Walter Act that allow exclusions solely for ideologi-
cal reasons.16 The bill sought to replace lengthy, confusing, and often
redundant language with more concise sections entitled "Security and
Related Grounds"'M6 and "Terrorist Activities." 168 It also contemplated
adding a section entitled "Review of Exclusion Lists"'" 9 that would
create guidelines to ensure that the Attorney General would review the
applications of those aliens excluded. Moreover, a corresponding sec-
tion making all changes applicable to deportation proceedings was
added.'70
The original Frank Bill eliminated the confusing and repetitive por-
tions of the exclusionary sections of the McCarran-Walter Act,' 7' but
retained provisions preventing former Nazis from entering the coun-
try 7 2 and the broad anti-terrorist provision allowing the government
discretionary power to stop terrorists from entering the United
States.7 3 Most importantly, the bill eliminated all language relating to
ideology or association. 7 4 Those who had called for reform of the Act
were pleased with the original Frank Bill, 75 although there was criti-
cism from both conservatives and liberals regarding the proposed
legislation. 76
166. H.R. 4427, supra note 162, § 2.
167. H.R. 4427, supra note 162, § 2(a)(3)(A). This section would give the consular
officer or Attorney General the power to exclude any individual that he has reasonable
grounds to believe is likely after entry, to engage in espionage, sabotage, or any other
activity that has the purpose of controlling or overthrowing the government of the
United States through the use of force, violence, or any other unconstitutional means.
Id.
168. Id. § 2(a)(3)(B)-(C). This section stated that the consular officer or the Attor-
ney General may exclude any alien who has engaged in a terrorist activity, or is likely
after entry to engage in any terrorist activity. Id. These activities include organizing,
abetting, raising funds for, or participating in an activity wantonly or with extreme
indifference to the risk of causing death or serious bodily injury to individuals not tak-
ing part in armed hostilities. Id.
169. Id. § 2(c).
170. Id. § 3.
171. Id.
172. Id. § 2(a)(3)(D).
173. Id. § 2(a)(3)(B).
174. Compare id. with 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)-(29) (1982) (noting the difference
in quantity and simplicity of the provisions).
175. See EXCLUSION HEARINGS, supra note 13, at 79-148 (including testimony
from public interest groups).
176. See id. at 153-93 (including statements of members of conservative groups
appearing at the hearing); Visa Denials, supra note 12, at 265 (criticizing the bill for
not going far enough to protect those applying for visas from denials based solely on
the applicant's alleged political beliefs or affiliations); Shapiro, supra note 12, at 937
(identifying constitutional problems with parts of the legislation). One commentator
criticizes the bill for failing, as does current law, to define the term "activity." Tilner,
supra note 12, at 494. Other critics were disturbed that the bill did not include a
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Representatives of both the State Department 17 and the Justice De-
partment 17 8 expressed concern over the extensive changes in the exclu-
sionary provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act. 79 Judge Abraham
Sofaer, the State Department's legal advisor, indicated, however, that
the department could accept the substantive changes in section
212(a)(28), including the repeal of the general exclusion of aliens
based solely on membership or affiliation with proscribed organizations
or their belief in certain doctrines.180 He cautioned that there should
remain executive latitude to protect national security interests, particu-
larly regarding the prevention of terrorism.181
The Frank Bill was approved by the House Judiciary Subcommittee
on Immigration, but opposition from conservatives in Congress and
among Reagan administration officials pressured Representative Frank
to offer a compromise bill.' 82 Many of the provisions from the earlier
version of the bill and many of the safeguards the administration de-
sired were included in this compromise bill.1 83 The substitute bill was
adopted by the Committee.8 Prior to the action by the Judiciary
Committee, however, legislation was passed that temporarily alleviated
some of the inequities of the McCarran-Walter Act.185
remedy for exclusions based on confidential information and for an alleged lack of due
process. See id. at 495 (summarizing the argument of a need for a hearing for aliens);
Helton, Legislative Proposals, supra note 12, at 492-500 (examining possible changes
in the legislation to make it conform to due process standards); see also infra note 217
and accompanying text (addressing criticisms based on alleged due process deprivation
and examining Senator Daniel Moynihan's bill that purports to address these
complaints).
177. ExCLUSION HEARINGS, supra note 13, at 28-45.
178. Id. at 46-52.
179. Id. at 35. As the Department of State noted in testimony before the Subcom-
mittee, virtually all cases of exclusion of aliens based solely on membership or affilia-
tion with proscribed organizations are waived under the McGovern Amendment. Id.
180. Id. at 28. Sofaer indicated that the State Department was dedicated to assur-
ing the free flow of all political ideas. Id.
181. Id. at 29.
182. Immigration Exclusion and Deportation Amendments, H.R. 4427, [hereinaf-
ter H.R. 4427 substitute], 100th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted as amended in IMMIGRA-
TION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-15 (1988). Facing opposition from conservatives on the Judici-
ary Committee, the House of Representatives, and the State Department, Congressman
Frank offered a substitute bill during the debate of H.R. 4427. Michaelson, supra note
62, at 173.
183. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182. The report language describes the in-
tent of the bill as to limit, but not eliminate, the executive's foreign policy exclusionary
ability. IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R.
REP. No. 100-882 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1988).
184. Id.
185. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1988, § 901, Pub. L. No. 100-204,
101 Stat. 1331, reprinted in 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182, at 122-23 (West Supp. 1988). Repre-
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B. A TEMPORARY REMEDY
As a temporary alternative to legislation designed to repeal the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act's exclusionary provisions, Congress passed a one
year provision to amend the Foreign Relations Authorization bill.186
This legislation temporarily eliminated the denial of visas by the execu-
tive branch for reasons of belief as well as for previous statements
made or for associations, if such a statement or belief is protected
under the United States Constitution when applied to a United States
citizen.18 7 Congress did not intend for this temporary provision to be-
come a comprehensive solution.188 Thus, the bill did not address many
of the thirty-three exclusionary provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act
and did not repeal any part of the Act.189 As the conference report on
the Authorization bill indicates, however, the intent of the amendment
was to protect first amendment freedoms, e1 0 with the expectation that
Congress would soon consider and possibly enact comprehensive legisla-
tion. 191 With legislation of this nature under consideration, Congress
has extended a narrower version of the temporary provision.102
sentative Barney Frank and Senator Patrick Moynihan combined their efforts to write
the amendment, and Senator Moynihan was responsible for introducing legislation in
the Senate to repeal the exclusionary sections of the McCarran-Valter Act. See infra
note 214 and accompanying text (describing this legislation).
186. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1988, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182, at 122-23
(\Vest Supp. 1988).
187. Id. § 901(b). The provision originally extended until March 1, 1989. Id. §
901(c).
188. Id. As the conference report on the Foreign Relations Authorization Act indi-
cated, its purpose was purely temporary and its scope was limited only to ideological
exclusions, thereby ignoring the rest of the McCarran-Walter Act's exclusionary provi-
sions. H.R. Rep. No. 475, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 163-65 (1987).
189. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1988, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182, at 122-23
(\Vest Supp. 1988). The provision retains all of the Attorney General's decision-making
latitude from the McCarran-Walter Act to exclude aliens for reasons of foreign policy,
national security interests, threats of terrorism, or those who seek to enter as a repre-
sentative of a purported labor organization in a country where such organizations are
instruments of a totalitarian state. Id. § 901(b)(I)-(3).
190. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 475, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 162, 163 (1987), reprinted
in 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhMN. NEws 2370, 2426. The conference substitute
continues to permit the denial of visas or the deportation of aliens when it is in the
interests of the United States, but makes it clear that it is not in the interests of the
United States to establish one standard of ideology for citizens and another for foreign-
ers who wish to visit the United States. Id.
191. Id. at 165, 1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 2374.
192. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
Act, § 503, Pub. L. No. 100-461, 102 Stat. 2268 (1988). The largest change in the law
as amended is that the extension applies only to non-immigrant aliens. Id. § (a). This
change applies immediately, superceding the former conditions, that were scheduled
originally to last until the end of 1988. Id. The new law prohibits deportations based on
activities occurring before January 1, 1991, or for those which deportation proceedings,
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C. THE SUBSTITUTE FRANK BILL
H.R. 4427, as it emerged from the Judiciary Committee, is a vastly
different bill from the one which Congress initially considered. 93 The
revised bill simplifies and amends the many exclusionary categories of
the McCarran-Walter Act into seven areas: health related grounds;"",
criminal and related grounds;195 public charge;196 labor certification;11
illegal entrants and immigration violators; 98 documentation grounds; 99
and those ineligible for citizenship.200 The bill also replaces sections
that address activities prejudicial to the public interest or security of
the United States, membership in proscribed organizations, espionage,
and participation in Nazi persecution, with a more comprehensive and
including judicial review proceedings, are pending between December 31, 1987 and
January 1, 1991. Id. § (d)(3).
Some commentators suggest that the temporary extension will aid those previously
excluded for ideological reasons such as Margaret Randall. Congress Extends § 901
Ban on Ideological Exclusions for Two Years, Interpreter Release, Oct. 7, 1988, at
1036. Others, however, are less optimistic about her future. Randall Case, (Con't.),
N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1988, at B5.
193. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182.
194. Id. § 2(a)(1). This is comparable to paragraphs 212(a)(1) through 212(a)(6)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which relate to mental retardation, insanity,
psychopathic personalities, sexual deviation, drug and alcohol abuse, and dangerous
contagious diseases. IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF
1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1988).
195. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(2). If enacted, this provision
would replace paragraphs 212(a)(9) through (13) and (23), which relate to conviction
of crimes of moral turpitude, polygamy, prostitution, immoral sexual acts, and narcot-
ics offenses. IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R.
REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 25 (1988).
196. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 12(a)(4). This section represents a
merging of 212(a) (7), (8), (15) and (25), incorporating health problems that prevent
an alien from earning a living, paupers, public charge, and illiteracy, respectively. IM-
MIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No.
100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1988).
197. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(5). This category would replace
212(a)(14) and (32), which relate to labor certification and foreign physicians. IMMI-
GRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-
882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1988).
198. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(6). This section would consoli-
date 212(a)(16)-(19) and (31), covering aliens seeking reentry, deported aliens seeking
reentry, stowaways, fraud and misrepresentation, as well as smuggling. IMMIGRATION
EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988).
199. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(7). This category would consoli-
date 212(a)(20), (21), and (26), relating to passport and visa violations. IMMIGRATION
EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988).
200. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(8). This section is comparable to
the current 212(a)(22). IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF
1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988).
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less confusing section entitled "Security and Related Grounds."201
The H.R. 4427 substitute adopts almost verbatim the wording of the
earlier version of the Frank bill regarding national security.20 2 It also
adds an entirely new and highly specific subsection with regard to the
definition of terrorist activities. 0 3 Furthermore, the bill adds a new sec-
tion on foreign policy that incorporates the language prohibiting former
Nazis from entering the country and also clarifies the grounds for re-
stricting an individual's entry.2" The section, however, places limita-
tions on these restrictions.2 0 5 Finally, with regard to ideological exclu-
sions, the new bill adds a section permitting the exclusion of "certain
trade union officers, officials and employees" in circumstances where
the organization is actually an instrument of the government.2 0 1
201. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3). This section is comparable to
the current 212(a)(27)-(29) and (33). IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION
AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1988).
202. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3).
203. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3)(ii). The bill defines numerous
specific individual activities that are unlawful, including the highijacking or sabotage of
any conveyance, hostage taking, the seizing or detaining and threatening to kill, injure,
or continue to detain another individual in order to compel a third person to do some-
thing. Id. It also includes assassination, the use of any explosive, biological agent,
chemical agent, nuplear weapon or device, firearm, or any other weapon with the intent
to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals, or to cause
substantial damage to property. Id. Additionally, a threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do
any of the foregoing activities is also incorporated in the bill. Id.
The bill defines a terrorist as one who, in an individual capacity or as a member of
an organization, participates in a terrorist attack or affords material support to any
individual, organization, or government in conducting a terrorist activity at any time.
Id. It also includes one who assists in the preparation or planning of a terrorist activity,
"gathers information on potential targets for terrorist activity," provides "any type of
material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications, funds, false
identification, weapons, explosives, or training, to any individual the actor knows or has
reason to believe has committed or plans to commit an act of terrorist activity." Id. It
also includes one who solicits funds or other things of value to terrorist activity. Id.
204. Id. § 2(a)(3)(D).
205. Id. § 2(a)(3)(C). The section on foreign policy gives the Secretary of State the
power to exclude those individuals who could have potentially serious adverse foreign
policy consequences, for the United States because such entry or activities would be
likely to result in imminent harm to the lives or property of United States persons
abroad or to property of the United States Government abroad. Id. Such activity or
entry is excludable if it would violate, or conflict with, an international obligation or
undertaking of the United States that would have a serious negative effect on the diplo-
matic relations or if it would convey the impression that the United States recognizes
or supports any government or group that the United States does not recognize or
support. Id.
Balancing this power, and vital to the legislation, is the section that prohibits and
limits exclusions because of any past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or as-
sociations which would be lawful within the United States. Id. § (i)(IV). The bill also
carries over from the earlier version of the bill a section which mandates the Secretary
of State to provide written notice to Congress of any denials under this section. Id.
206. Id. § 2(a)(3)(E)(i). This section is meant to differentiate between delegations
4791989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Whereas critics of the earlier version of the bill, such as the State"'
and Justice Departments,10 believed it would hamper the government's
effectiveness in preventing terrorists from infiltrating the United States,
the new legislation effectively incorporates many of these recommenda-
tions. The report of the Judiciary Committee noted that the bill's defi-
nition of terrorism is broad enough to cover a wide variety of illegal
acts that contribute to the commission of terrorist attacks.2 00 On the
other hand, the report specifically recognized that the bill does not in-
tend to penalize an alien for mere membership in any organization. 10
The bill also includes specific prohibitions against the Palestinian Lib-
eration Organization, a concern of many members of Congress and the
State Department.1
V. ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
While the original Frank proposal to reform the McCarran-Walter
Act was extensive, many viewed it as too drastic, and no consensus for
change was formed. 2  The more pragmatic Frank substitute merges
these earlier reforms with the protections of national security interests
desired by the State and Justice Departments. 1 The foreign policy
section of the revised bill, while granting the executive branch the free-
dom necessary to exclude individuals, insures cautious use of this au-
of trade union officials, primarily from Eastern bloc nations, who are representatives of
a totalitarian government and labor unions such as Solidarity, that represent the inter-
ests of Polish workers. IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF
1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1988).
207. Exclusion Hearings, supra note 13, at 36-37.
208. Id. at 46-47.
209. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DE-
PORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-
30 (1988).
210. Id. at 25-26.
211. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3)(B)(iii) & (IV). The language
on the PLO was added to the section on terrorism through an amendment offered by
Congressman Larry Smith. Michaelson, supra note 62, at 1731. The amendment would
allow the exclusion of any Palestine Liberation Organization official or representative.
Id. Smith's original proposal, although defeated, would have applied to all members of
the PLO. Id. In cases where the individual is not an officer, official, representative or
spokesman for the PLO the Government must apply the definitions of "terrorist activ-
ity" and "engages in terrorist activity" on a case by case basis. IMMIGRATION EXCLU-
SION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 29-30 (1988).
212. See Exclusion Hearings, supra note 13 at 153-93 (including statements from
individuals opposing the legislation).
213. Compare supra notes 163-85 and accompanying text (describing early con-
gressional legislation to reform the McCarran-Walter Act) with supra notes 208-20
and accompanying text (describing the interests of the State and Justice Departments).
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thority and thus represents a vast improvement over current law. 14
Furthermore, although the Frank substitute continues to grant exten-
sive power to the executive over the exclusion of aliens,215 the bill
checks this power by disallowing exclusion on the basis of past, current,
or expected beliefs, statements or associations that are considered law-
ful within the United States. 216
Some have criticized the proposed legislation because it does not
grant extensive due process rights to aliens who are rejected for admis-
sion. 1 This type of hearing, however, is in contrast to the history of
differentiation between governmental exclusion of aliens who are trying
to enter this country and those who already have entered and are trying
to become citizens.218 Notwithstanding this absence, the substitute
Frank Bill is designed to make the system more open and
214. See H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3)(C)(i) (allowing restric-
tions on aliens if their presence in the United States has a detrimental effect on United
States foreign policy). Id. This section limits the restrictions on individuals whose gov-
ernment the United States does not recognize or support. Id. § 2(a)(3)(c)(i)(II). The
limitations are divided into two classes: those where the alien is a candidate for high
government office, and those where the alien purports to be a representative of the
government or group. Id. § 2(a)(3)(c)(i)(II).
215. Id. § 2(a)(3)(C)(i)(IV).
216. Id. § 2(a)(3)(C)(ii)(I). A similar provision is included in the section on depor-
tation of aliens. Id. § 3(a)(7)(B).
217. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text (noting comments calling for
due process improvements in the law). Some commentators believe that such hearings
and due process requirements are necessary in any legislative reform. Id. One expert in
this area suggests that the procedural distinction among aliens excluded under the dif-
ferent provisions of the Act is one that should be eliminated in order to protect against
arbitrary agency action. Helton, supra note 12, at 485. One reason President Truman
vetoed the McCarran-Walter Act was because it gave lower level consular and immi-
gration officials an unreviewable power to exclude. President's Message to Congress
Vetoing the Immigration and Nationality Act, 1952-53 PUB. PAPERS 441 (June 25,
1952). The denial of a due process hearing for those aliens whose entrance the govern-
ment feels would be "prejudicial to the interests of the United States" has been held
constitutional. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 n.8
(1952).
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan introduced legislation designed to address both the
overly broad exclusionary policies of section 212(a)(28) and what he considers the fail-
ure of current provisions for reviewing claims under sections 212(a)(27) and (29). S.
28, 100th Cong. (1987). The first part of his proposed legislation would eliminate sec-
tion 212(a)(28), and the second part would create a formal process of review allowing
United States citizens to bring a civil action against any official of the United States
Government. Id. This legislation would create a right of appeal for aliens excluded on
the basis of confidential information under sections 212(a)(27)-(29), equivalent to
other sections of the Immigration Act. Id. The Moynihan bill has other problems, how-
ever, including its failure to repeal sections 212(a)(27) and (28). Id. In retaining those
provisions that are the source of most of the confusion surrounding this part of the
immigration law, the legislation still leaves considerable room for prejudicial and ideo-
logical exclusions. See Helton, supra note 12, at 480-91 (examining in detail Senator
Moynihan's proposal).
218. TuBE, supra note 74, § 5-16 at 359-60.
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accountable. 1 9
Equally indicative of the intent of the drafters of this legislation, and
important to how the courts will make their determinations, 220 is the
language of the report of the Judiciary Committee on this bill. This
language notes that the goal of the legislation is to prevent the exclu-
sion of aliens on the basis of their beliefs or membership in organiza-
tions, while simultaneously allowing under limited circumstances exclu-
sions to protect United States citizens, property, or vital foreign policy
interests.22' In clearly establishing this intent, and more specifically re-
serving certain first amendment rights, the Committee has begun to
clarify thirty-five years of struggle over an antiquated legislative his-
tory and misinterpreted court decisions. Courts are equally eager to
embrace a new standard, whether judicially created, as the court in
Harvard Forum did or legislatively mandated, as the temporary mea-
sure that was passed as an amendment to the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act.222
The effect of these changes is dramatic, a power already acknowl-
edged by several courts. In Randall, the circuit court noted that the
219. See H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3)(O)(ii)(II) (dealing with
the responsibility of the Secretary of State to make a report within 30 days). This
Section mandates that the Secretary of State provide written notice of why he has
denied an alien a visa or entry under clause (i)(IV). Id. The bill also makes changes in
the procedure for challenging exclusions. Id. § 4(a)(13)-(15). Under current law, an
alien is entitled to appeal an immigration judge's order to the Attorney General, except
when the exclusion is made on the "political" grounds of sections 212(a)(27)-(29). 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27)-(29) (1982). The spirit of this was affirmed in Abourezk v. Rea-
gan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam).
The original Frank bill proposed to codify this principle, yet the Department of Jus-
tice strongly objected to it on the grounds that it would create endless litigation. Ex-
CLUSION HEARINGS, supra note 13, at 49. This bill expanded the standard of judicial
review from the "facially legitimate and bona fide reasons" suggested by the court in
Kleindienst, to the one used for reviewing administrative decisions generally, presuma-
bly a much higher standard. Tilner, supra note 12, at 83, n.594.
The substitute Frank bill also revises the summary exclusion provisions of the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 4(a)(13)-(15). Under
these provisions, aliens who are allegedly excludable on the basis of espionage, sabo-
tage, technology transfer, violent or unlawful overthrow of the government, and terror-
ist activity will be provided limited due process procedures before an immigration
judge. IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R. REP.
No. 100-882 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1988). While the information may be reviewed
in camera, the Committee noted that whenever possible classified information should
be publicly disclosed. Id. at 39.
220. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1058-59 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (discuss-
ing the differing opinions after examinations of the legislative history of the law), aJf'd,
484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam).
221. IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R.
REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1988).
222. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1988, § 901, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182, at
122-23 (West Supp. 1988).
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temporary change in the law created a new standard preventing depor-
tations based solely on ideological reasons.22 The court in this case
mooted an earlier Immigration and Naturalization Service official's de-
portation order.224 Similarly, in Allende, the Court of Appeals recog-
nized the important change in policy and its effect on the lower court's
decision.225 The revised Frank Bill incorporates the intent of the tempo-
rary provision as well as protecting the governmental interests ex-
pressed in litigation on this matter, and further expands it to cover the
entire range of exclusionary categories.226
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The temporary amendment of the exclusionary provisions227 and the
limited extension of that amendment228 demonstrate that there exists
the potential for creating a fairer standard through which the courts
can more accurately weigh national security considerations against the
first amendment right to receive information of American citizens. This
potential can only be realized if complete reform of the McCarran-
Walter Act occurs.229
The most appropriate remedy for this change is H.R. 4427, the cur-
rent proposal of Representative Barney Frank, as reported out by the
House Judiciary Committee. The adoption of this legislation would
solve the two major problems with the current law and with courts'
interpretation of it: the outdated nature of the current statute,2 30 and
223. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See Foreign Relations
Authorization Act of 1988 § 901(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182, at 132-33 (Vest Supp. 1988)
(stating that, under the amendment, an alien cannot be denied a visa on the basis of his
or her beliefs, statements, or associations, if an American citizen could not be prose-
cuted for the same beliefs, statements, or associations).
224. Randall v. Meese, 854 F.2d 472, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
225. Allende v. Shultz, 845 F.2d 1111, 1121 (Ist Cir. 1986).
226. See generally IMnhGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AbENDM.IENTs OF
1988, H.R. REP. No. 882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988) (incorporating the sunset pro-
visions into the revised bill).
227. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1988, § 901, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182, at
122-23 (West Supp. 1988).
228. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropiations
Act, § 503, Pub. L. No. 100-461, 102 Stat. 2268 (1988).
229. Id. Section 901 is incomplete in that it does not in any way repeal the exclu-
sionary sections of the McCarran-Walter Act. Id. It ignores refinement of regulations
of exclusions based on health reasons, reasons of retardation, insanity, and homosexual-
ity. Id.
230. See CRS REPORT, supra note 53, at 1 (illustrating that the Act was a product
of the Cold War). Congress passed the McCarran-Walter Act during a period when
the United States was in the grips of anti-Communist fervor that had grown out of the
end of World War II and fear of foreigners and scapegoating was at its zenith. W.
ISAACSON & E. THOmAs, THE WISE MEN, Six FRIENDS AND THE WORLD THEY MADE
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
the need for a new legal standard to determine the reach of the govern-
ment's exclusionary power.
Monitoring entrance into the United States is a valid precaution for
the government to take when it is based on national security interests.
Nevertheless, this power must be balanced with rights and privileges
possessed by American citizens, notably the right to receive informa-
tion. 3' In an attempt to balance these interests, the Supreme Court
developed a standard to regulate the government's power.232 Unfortu-
nately, this standard is inadequate because it fails to address critical
first amendment issues. As a result, lower courts have frequently de-
parted from the Supreme Court's standard and have created case-by-
case remedies.2 33 Were it not for the importance of the conflict between
the first amendment and national security, these makeshift remedies
might be appropriate. Instead, they compound the problem due to their
reliance on legislative history that is more than thirty-five years old.234
The Frank bill addresses the problem adequately because it replaces
old, vaguely worded law with more efficient up-to-date language.3 0 In
general, it removes the government's virtually absolute power to ex-
clude individuals, and provides specific language to define the scope of
the government's ability to prohibit individuals from entering the
United States.23 6 Specifically, it removes the unfounded prohibitions on
"mental defectives," "paupers," and those with "sexual deviations. '237
373-76 (1986). Our former Soviet ally became our most feared enemy, and many of
the laws passed at that time, including the McCarran-Walter Act, focused on prevent-
ing the spread of Communism. Id. at 268-69. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying
text (describing the legislation leading up to the omnibus 1952 Immigration and Na-
tionality Act). This conversion to the new realism of anti-bolshevism existed even in the
executive office with the ascension of President Truman. ISAACSON & THOMAS, supra
at 253-87.
As a result, a greater number of aliens trying to enter this country were unfairly
denied rights because of fear gripping this country. Many famous scientists, politicians,
and cultural leaders were prohibited, detained, or deported because of prior associa-
tions or governmental suspicion of their past. See supra note 72 and accompanying text
(describing some of the exclusions from the United States that occurred as a result of
the MeCarran-Walter Act).
231. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969).
232. See supra notes 79-88 and accompanying text (discussing the standard
adopted by the Court in Kleindienst to regulate government behavior).
233. See supra notes 110-17 and accompanying text (examining the Court's depar-
ture from the Kleindienst standard in the Harvard Forum case).
234. See Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1054-73 n. 11, 20-27 (1986) ajd,
484 U.S. 1 (1987) (per curiam) (noting the differing interpretations of the legislative
history and the problematic nature of this scenario).
235. See supra notes 193-206 and accompanying text (describing section-by-section
differences between the Frank bill and current law).
236. See id. (describing the Frank substitute legislation).
237. See supra notes 194-96 and accompanying text (noting the elimination of
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Those categories of persons were excludable under the McCarran-Wal-
ter Act because of the fearful and frequently ignorant populace of
nearly half a century ago.2e Moreover, it proposes to remove the vague
language of section 212(a)(28) that allows for prohibitions on political
grounds with a standard that more closely conforms to the Bill of
Rights.239
In addition, the Frank bill retains important legislative tools so that
the government may prevent what is one of today's greatest fears -
international terrorism.4 0 Unlike the heavy-handed McCarran-Walter
Act, however, the bill is specific about which people, groups, and activi-
ties fall into the category of terrorists. 241 A pragmatic legislative propo-
sal, which has a legitimate chance of receiving support from the execu-
tive branch, as well as from both liberals and conservatives in
Congress, must retain at least some of these powers.
Nevertheless, there are some areas where the Frank bill could be
further refined to comport with individual liberties. The intent of the
bill is to ensure that law-abiding individuals are not denied entry to the
United States simply because their political ideology is not shared by
most Americans. 2 The bill does not acknowledge, however, that some
of the government's security needs could be met through existing mea-
sures, such as international anti-terrorism agreements. 48
prohibitions of "mental defectives," "paupers," and "'sexual deviates" within the Frank
substitute legislation).
238. See supra note 194 and accompanying text (describing proposed changes in
this section of the law).
239. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3)(C)(ii). "This section states
that an alien is not excludable ... or subject to restrictions or conditions on entry into
the United States, because of any past, current, or expected beliefs, statements, or
associations which would be lawful within the United States." Id.
240. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3)(B). See Comment, The Use
of Force in Combatting Terrorism, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 377, 377 (1987)(noting an annual increase in international terrorist incidents of 12-15% and examin-
ing methods of response).
241. Id.; see IMMIGRATION ExcLusION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988,
H.R. REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (noting that officers, officials,
representatives and spokesmen for the PLO are considered as engaged in terrorist ac-
tivity). The bill also provides a definition of terrorist activity for persons not included
within a recognized terrorist group. Id.
242. IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AN DEPORTATION AENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R.
REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 15.
243. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, opened for signa-
ture, Mar. 3, 1980, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1419, 1431 (1979); International Conven-
tion Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doe. A/34/46 (1980); Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including
Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1977, T.I.A.S. No.
8532, 1033 U.N.T.S. 167; The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civilian Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No.
1989] 485
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The recent extension of the temporary change in the law was also a
step backward,244 indicative of the continuing legislative difficulties of
7570, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971);
Convention on Aviation: Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219. The
United States is also a party to the regional agreement on the Convention to Prevent
and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and
Related Extortion that are of International Significance, 27 U.S.T. 3949, T.I.A.S. No.
8413. In 1984 the United States joined with other industrialized nations in a Declara-
tion on International Terrorism. See Intoccia, International Legal and Policy Implica-
tions of an American Counter-Terrorist Strategy, 14 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 121,
124 n. 19 (1986) (examining the international agreements to stop international
terrorism).
Some commentators acknowledge the difficulty of enforcing anti-terrorism agree-
ments, including extradition treaties. See Comment, Legislative Responses to Interna-
tional Terrorism: International and National Efforts to Deter and Punish Terrorists, 9
B.C. INT'L & ComP. L. REV. 323, 352-59 (1986)(examining gaps in international and
national legislation but concluding that the international community can create effec-
tive legal controls to combat terrorism); Comment, Combatting International Terror-
ism: Limiting the Political Exception Doctrine in Order to Prevent "One Man's Ter-
rorism from Becoming Another Man's Heroism," 31 VILL. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (1986)
(noting that even though states have been largely unable to stop terrorist acts, they
have the duty under aut dedera, out judicare to bring the perpetrators to justice);
Note, Extradition in An Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political Offense
Exception, 61 N.Y.U.L. REV 654, 665 (1986) (noting that the United States has
refused to extradite persons accused, and even convicted, of terrorist activities by other
nations). One reason these treaties are often ineffective is the inability of nations to
universally define "terrorism." Id. at 654 n.l.
Other writers have noted additional problems in enforcing anti-terrorism agreements.
See Lillich & Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens Occasioned by Ter-
rorist Activities, 26 AM. U.L. REV. 217, 278 (1977) (examining the difficulty of states
anticipating terrorist attacks and the contribution of this factor to preventing their
occurrence).
Furthermore, the appeals court in Abourezk v. Reagan noted that even with its
somewhat limiting statutory analysis, the State Department would still be able to re-
strict individuals' entry by virtue of groups' affiliation with terrorist groups or organ-
ized crime syndicates. Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1986), afl'd, 108 S.Ct. 252 (1987) (per curiam). The restriction on the basis of mem-
bership in organized crime probably would remain in the law, since it was not ad-
dressed by the proposed legislation, and the restrictions on members of terrorist organi-
zations are more specific, but equally effective in the new legislation. See supra note
206 and accompanying text (describing the provisions allowing the exclusion of individ-
uals categorized as "terrorist").
As recently demonstrated by a California district court, the government's plenary
authority to enforce "anti-terrorism" is much more limited in the deportation context.
See American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, No. CV 87-02107-SVW,
slip op. at 33-37 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 1989) (finding the deportation provisions unconsti-
tutionally overbroad as to violate the first amendment because they prosecute mere
association and advocacy).
244. See Foreign Operations Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropria-
tion Act, § 503, Pub. L. No. 100-461, 102 Stat. 2268 (1988) (including a change from
the previous temporary change in the law to extend the ban on ideological exclusions
and deportations only to nonimmigrants). Id. Congress has the power to regulate citi-
zenship. U.S. CONST. art. I sec. 8, cI. 4. The change in this temporary law is therefore
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reform in this area of law. Any permanent and comprehensive legisla-
tion that Congress passes to reform the McCarran-Walter Act should
consider changing this to insure that both the law relating to exclusion
and deportation comport with the intent of the proposed legislation,
which is that the exclusion or deportation is based on speech instead of
activities.
The Frank bill, on the other hand, adequately addresses the potential
foreign policy dangers to the government that occur whenever there is
an entry into this country of representatives from non-friendly foreign
governments.245 The bill provides, in part, specific timetables about
when a visiting candidate for foreign office can enter the United States
and when individuals associated with certain political groups may enter
the United States if that association will have a negative effect on dip-
lomatic relations.4 6
Other potential defects of the proposed legislation are negligible. As
already noted, the lack of an additional due process standard to the
Frank bill, for instance, for which some have criticized it, is not a fatal
flaw.247 Furthermore, the addition of such a standard would change the
intrinsic nature of the relationship between the government and those
aliens attempting to enter the country.4 8 On the other hand, the intent
of this legislation is to reaffirm basic American commitments to speech
and association that are already constitutional standards.4 0 Moreover,
because of the possibility that the executive or his representatives at the
Justice Department and the Immigration and Nationalization Service
might abuse their discretion, there is a need for checks on the govern-
ment's power. The proposed bill addresses this in a united manner,
through the inclusion of a monitoring system requiring the Attorney
General to constantly review and report to Congress on the actions he
consistent with current law as it relates to aliens attempting to enter the United States
and those who already reside here. See supra note 75 (discussing the differences in
stature of resident and entering aliens).
245. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3)(C).
246. Id. § 2(a)(3)(C)(i)(II), (III) (IV).
247. See supra notes 76, 217 and accompanying text (discussing the due process
criticisms of the Frank bill and the failures of the Moynihan provision).
248. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-16 at 355-58 (noting the differing standards
adopted for resident and nonresident aliens). But see Arab-American Anti-Discrimina-
tion Comm. v. Meese, No. CV 87-02107-SVW, slip op. at 32-33 (holding that there is
no difference between non-immigrant aliens and permanent resident aliens and finding
that both have the first amendment rights afforded American citizens; see also supra
note 75 and accompanying text (noting cases establishing the distinction between resi-
dent and nonresident aliens).
249. IMMIGRATION EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION AMENDMENTS OF 1988, H.R.
REP. No. 100-882, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 15-16.
1989]
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or other executive branch officials take.250
Chief executives and their administrations have interpreted the Mc-
Carran-Walter Act in different ways. The adoption of the Frank legis-
lation is necessary because any political party that controls the immi-
gration mechanisms can abuse them.2"" As the courts flounder with
outdated and vague judicial precedent, the executive branch continues
to exert its power whenever and wherever it can. The need for legisla-
tion, geared not toward eliminating the ability of the executive to main-
tain the nation's borders for security reasons, but rather toward mini-
mizing exclusion decisions based solely on ideology, is vital.
CONCLUSION
The United States was founded as a haven for dissenters. To exclude
those who now seek refuge, or to refuse them a forum to express their
views infringes on American citizens' freedoms of speech, association,
and the ability to receive information, no matter how controversial.
The deference to the executive branch, defined through congressional
mandate, may be appropriate. Such a mandate, however, must be con-
sistent with the ideals and standards of a modern nation. Americans
can not achieve the proper execution of their constitutional system if
they use a standard that is outdated, vague and difficult to interpret.
There is always the possibility that new legislation will create faulty
judicial interpretation through either a misunderstanding of legislative
history or a reaction to political events of the times. Congress, however,
must establish a standard for modern times, and depart from the ear-
lier xenophobic period. The potential danger to the stability of the
United States from exposure to the most dissident of ideas is far out-
weighed by the cost of their suppression.
250. H.R. 4427 substitute, supra note 182, § 2(a)(3)(C)(ii)(II).
251. See Abrams, The New Effort to Control Information, N.Y. TIMES MAGA-
ZINE, Sept. 25, 1983, at 20, 23 (examining the Reagan administration's uses of immi-
gration law to control the dissemination of information); Shapiro, supra note 12, at
934-35 (questioning the partisan nature of exclusions); Visa Denials, supra note 12, at
249, 259 (noting potential political motivation of the Reagan Administration for exclu-
sions); see also Note, Immigration Law: The Role of the Supreme Court in Policy
Development, 22 NEw ENG. L. REV. 131, 162 (1987) (suggesting that the government
has not been responsive to an increasing opposition to its "restrictive politically biased
attitude").
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